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UNIFYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
THROUGH STEREOTYPE THEORY 
by 
Stephanie Bornstein* 
Has litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached 
the limit of its utility in advancing workplace equality? After four dec-
ades of forward progress on antidiscrimination law in the courts, Su-
preme Court decisions in the last decade have signaled a retrenchment, 
disapproving of key theories scholars and advocates had pursued to ad-
dress workplace discrimination in its modern, more subtle and structural 
forms. Yet sex and race inequality at work endure, particularly in pay 
and at the top of organizations. 
Notably, while the Roberts Court majority appears skeptical that discrim-
ination persists and resistant to recognizing the role of employers in con-
tinued inequality, one subset of discrimination cases has enjoyed relative 
success in the courts: sex discrimination cases relying on the legal theory 
of sex stereotyping. In particular, plaintiffs alleging that they were dis-
criminated against at work based on the operation of sex stereotypes relat-
ed to family caregiving responsibilities or transgender status have pushed 
federal appellate and district courts toward a contemporary understand-
ing of the operation of bias. Despite this unusual success during an oth-
erwise bleak period in antidiscrimination law, advances in caregiver and 
transgender discrimination lawsuits remain on the margins, siloed in 
their own category of litigation. 
This Article argues that theoretical and doctrinal advances in sex stereo-
typing cases have broad application, with the potential to reinvigorate 
employment discrimination litigation under Title VII as a whole. The 
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Article suggests that precedent from pioneering sex discrimination cases 
can and should be applied to cases alleging discrimination on other ba-
ses, including race and national origin. It proposes a more coherent, 
unified approach to antidiscrimination law that capitalizes on recent 
courts’ recognition of the operation of sex stereotypes at work. In an era 
in which the advancement of equality has stalled in both the workplace 
and the Supreme Court, a unified approach to Title VII litigation 
framed around stereotype theory offers an important path forward for an-
tidiscrimination law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Has litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached 
the limit of its utility in advancing workplace equality? After four decades 
of forward progress in Supreme Court interpretations of the reach of Ti-
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tle VII and similar statutes,1 decisions during the Roberts Court era have 
signaled a regression.2 The Court majority appears to have reached a 
high point of skepticism about the persistence of intentional sex and race 
discrimination and of resistance to holding employers responsible for 
their role in continued workplace inequality.3 Where, in the past, legal 
theories that pushed the definition of unlawful discrimination to match 
modern manifestations of bias were met with some success,4 Court deci-
sions in the last decade indicate that such advancement has stalled.5 
No two cases illustrate this trend better than 2009’s Ricci v. DeStefano6 
and 2011’s Wal-Mart v. Dukes7—decisions in which the Court limited the 
reach of key legal theories designed to redress more modern, “second 
1 See infra Part I.A. 
2 See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013) (prohibiting a “mixed-motive” theory of proof for retaliation claims); Vance v. 
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (limiting who constitutes a “supervisor” for 
purposes of hostile work environment claims); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) 
(strengthening the “ministerial exception” for employer liability under Title VII); 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (limiting employer efforts to avoid disparate 
impact claims); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (prohibiting a “mixed 
motive” theory of proof under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); AT&T 
Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) (limiting time for bringing pregnancy 
discrimination claims); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (permitting 
mandatory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (limiting time for bringing pay discrimination 
claims, later abrogated by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 
123 Stat. 5–7 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012))). The Court has, however, 
refused to narrow certain pieces of Title VII doctrine related to religious 
discrimination, see Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015), pregnancy accommodation, see Young v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), and anti-retaliation protections, see Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
3 See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 
(2011) (“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation . . . would 
select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce 
no actionable disparity at all.”). The Roberts Court cases on affirmative action also 
bear out this new skepticism, as exemplified by the Chief Justice’s notorious 
statement in opposition to race-based affirmative action that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
4 See infra Part I; see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
(recognizing disparate impact theory); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 
(1986) (recognizing hostile work environment sexual harassment theory); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing mixed-motive liability and 
stereotype theory).  
5 See infra Part I.A. 
6 557 U.S. 557. 
7 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
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generation” discrimination.8 For thirty years after Title VII’s enactment 
in 1964, litigation efforts centered on enforcement to prohibit obvious, if 
not overt, discrimination and harassment. By the mid-1990s, however, 
workplace discrimination had become less explicit and more subtle, rela-
tional, and structural in nature.9 In response, scholars and advocates 
breathed new life into Title VII by developing litigation theories that 
adapted to reach this more covert operation of bias, focusing on liability 
for employment decisions infected with implicit bias10 and challenging 
directly workplace structures that appeared facially neutral but that had 
disparate effects by sex or race.11 The use of implicit bias and disparate 
impact theories as a means of reaching more diffuse, entrenched dis-
crimination gained momentum in the lower courts and in practice from 
the mid-1990s until the late-2000s, when both theories came before the 
Roberts Court. In 2009, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court limited the reach 
of the disparate impact theory by holding that an employer may not take 
efforts to remedy a workplace practice that has discriminatory effects on 
some without risking liability for intentional discrimination against oth-
ers whom the practice favors.12 Two years later, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the 
Court narrowly circumscribed the use of “social framework” evidence to 
establish employer liability for workplace practices that fail to prevent the 
operation of implicit bias and result in discrimination.13 As a result of 
these decisions, the two most prominent theories that helped redress 
workplace discrimination in its increasingly subtle and structural forms 
have been—while not entirely proscribed—severely hobbled. 
Yet employment inequality persists, particularly in pay and at the top 
of organizational hierarchies. While Title VII litigation radically trans-
8 This term was coined by Columbia Law Professor Susan Sturm to describe how 
“[c]ognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of 
interaction . . . replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of . . . continued 
inequality.” Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 460 (2001). The trend of narrowing legal theories 
designed to remedy second generation discrimination was also reflected in the 
Court’s 2009 and 2013 decisions limiting the availability of the mixed-motive theory 
of proof for age discrimination and retaliation claims. See generally Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (retaliation); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 
U.S. 167 (2009) (age). 
9 See infra Part I.A. See generally Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace 
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 91, 95–99 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1161, 1199 (1995); Sturm, supra note 8, at 468–74. 
10 See infra Part II.B.2. See generally Krieger, supra note 9, at 1241–42. 
11 See infra Part II.B.1. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking 
Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911 (2006). 
12 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009). 
13 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011). 
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formed the ability of women and racial minorities to enter the workforce 
and to be protected from workplace harassment,14 equal pay and equal 
access to advancement opportunities remain elusive, occupational segre-
gation persists stubbornly, and race and sex diversity diminishes the 
higher you go up the chain of command at many organizations. Data 
from 2013 on the gender wage gap shows that women engaged in full-
time year-round work earn only 78 cents to every dollar that white men 
earn—a figure that has remained stagnant since 2001.15 For women of 
color, the data is worse: in 2013, Latinas earned only 54 cents and Afri-
can-American women only 64 cents to the dollar.16 Studies of diversity at 
the top of a variety of fields show that women and racial minorities are 
still drastically underrepresented in leadership. Despite making up nearly 
half of the U.S. workforce, women are only 8.1% of the country’s top 
earners, 4.6% of CEOs in the Fortune 500, and 14 to 16% of corporate 
executive officers, law firm equity partners, and senior management in 
Silicon Valley.17 Likewise, while racial minorities make up one-third of 
the U.S. workforce, only 4.2% of Fortune 500 CEOs and 5.6% of law firm 
equity partners are people of color.18 Segregation among jobs and indus-
tries by sex and race appears as intractable as ever: recent studies identi-
fied that over 40% of women (or men) would have to change jobs for the 
U.S. workforce to be fully integrated by gender.19 
Of course, data on inequality at work does not prove discrimination: 
Demographic realities, individual choices, and legitimate business deci-
sions all likely contribute to continued workplace disparities by sex and 
14 See generally U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, American Experiences 
Versus American Expectations (July 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
reports/american_experiences/index.cfm (documenting impact of Title VII from 1966 
to 2013). 
15 See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay 
Gap 3 (2015). 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 See Judith Warner, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The Women’s Leadership Gap: 
Women’s Leadership by the Numbers 1–2 (2014). 
18 See Crosby Burns, Kimberly Barton & Sophia Kerby, Ctr. for Am. 
Progress, The State of Diversity in Today’s Workforce: As Our Nation 
Becomes More Diverse So Too Does Our Workforce 2, 5 (2012); Despite Small 
Gains in the Representation of Women and Minorities Among Equity Partners, Broad 
Disparities Remain, NALP Bull. (June 2015), http://www.nalp.org/0615research. 
19 See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality 
Persists in the Modern World 5 (2011) (citations omitted); Youngjoo Cha, 
Overwork and the Persistence of Gender Segregation in Occupations, 27 Gender & Soc’y 158, 
159 (2013); see also Darrick Hamilton, Algernon Austin & William Darity Jr., Econ. 
Policy Inst., Whiter Jobs, Higher Wages: Occupational Segregation and the Lower Wages of 
Black Men (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/BriefingPaper288.pdf; 
Derek Thompson, The Workforce Is Even More Divided by Race Than You Think, Atlantic 
Monthly (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11 
/the-workforce-is-even-more-divided-by-race-than-you-think/281175/. 
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race. But, as differences in workforce participation rates and educational 
achievement by sex and race diminish over time, the proportion of per-
sistent inequality that may be attributable to discrimination—whether 
conscious or not—grows. In 2010, over one-quarter of all Bachelor’s, 
Master’s, and Doctorate degrees were earned by racial minorities, up 
from just over 20% a decade earlier.20 In 2010, between 53 and 63% of all 
such degrees were earned by women, with women in every racial category 
earning more than half of all degrees conferred—up from between 47 
and 60% a decade earlier.21 Arguments that there are not enough quali-
fied women and people of color in the pipeline to work in middle and 
upper management ring increasingly hollow. 
Given this state of affairs in the Supreme Court and in the work-
place, it may appear that antidiscrimination litigation under Title VII has 
run its course as a means of reaching entrenched bias at work. In contrast 
to the generally bleak picture of the state of antidiscrimination law over 
the past decade, however, one bright spot offers a way forward. In the 
same time period that the Supreme Court has restricted two key legal 
theories for challenging contemporary discrimination, one subset of em-
ployment discrimination cases has enjoyed relative success in the courts: 
sex discrimination lawsuits relying on the legal theory of stereotyping.22 
In particular, plaintiffs alleging that they were discriminated against at 
work based on the operation of sex stereotypes related to their family 
caregiving responsibilities or transgender status23 have pushed federal 
district and appellate courts toward a modern understanding of the op-
eration of bias in its more covert and structural forms. Yet despite the 
unusual success of the stereotyping approach during a period in which 
antidiscrimination law was otherwise narrowed by the Court,24 advances 
20 See Fast Facts: Degrees Conferred by Sex and Race, Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics 
(May 2012), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf. 
21 See id. 
22 By “success” here and throughout the Article, I mean success on a dispositive 
procedural motion, such as a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Because so 
few employment discrimination cases go to trial, the ability of a plaintiff to defeat a 
defendant’s dispositive motion often proves determinative in the case (for example, 
by leading to settlement). The development of Title VII doctrine has occurred 
primarily through federal court decisions on such pleadings. See Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 518 (2010). 
23 For conciseness and consistency, I use the term “transgender status” and 
“transgender discrimination” to refer to all cases alleging discrimination on the basis 
of gender identity or expression where a plaintiff’s self-identity or presentation differs 
from assigned sex at birth (e.g., many plaintiffs are identified in their cases as 
“transsexual”). This does not, however, encompass the separate concept of 
discrimination based on “sexual orientation,” which has been treated differently from 
gender identity under the law of Title VII by many federal courts. See infra note 182. 
24 See infra Part I.B.3. 
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in caregiver and transgender discrimination cases remain on the mar-
gins, generally regarded as their own category of litigation. 
This Article argues that there is still room for progress toward great-
er workplace equality by drawing on novel litigation theories under Title 
VII. Doctrinal and theoretical advances in cutting-edge sex stereotyping
cases have broad application that can reinvigorate employment discrimi-
nation litigation as a whole. The Article identifies how federal courts’ 
understanding of sex stereotypes in the context of motherhood and gen-
der identity demonstrate courts’ ability to apply traditional employment 
discrimination doctrine in a more nuanced and contemporary way. If 
courts are able to perceive potential discrimination based on such stereo-
types, this Article argues, they can and should apply this lens to all cases 
in which there is evidence of unlawful stereotyping, regardless of the pro-
tected classification. Courts’ understanding of the operation of imper-
missible stereotypes at work is essential to the development of antidis-
crimination law as a whole because very few employment discrimination 
cases ever get to a jury—a judge’s decision on a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment makes or breaks most cases.25 By identifying and ana-
lyzing court decisions in recent sex stereotyping litigation, the Article 
aims to construct a more coherent, contemporary approach to recogniz-
ing bias in all Title VII cases that can pave a way forward in the era of 
Wal-Mart and Ricci.26 
Recent Supreme Court constraints on implicit bias and disparate 
impact theories have been in the context of cases seeking class-wide re-
lief, whereas sex stereotyping theories have been successful mostly in cas-
es seeking individual relief. Nevertheless, if courts can recognize how ste-
reotypes operate to disadvantage individual transgender and caregiver 
plaintiffs at work, the Article argues, this insight can be extended to bol-
ster both individual and class cases alleging similar patterns of stereotyp-
ing regardless of protected class. And arguably, the Supreme Court could 
act to curtail the sex stereotyping approach to Title VII litigation, as it has 
done with implicit bias and disparate impact theories. Yet, to date, the 
Court has not overturned expansive appellate court readings of stereo-
type theory,27 which the Court itself created in its germinal 1989 case Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.28 
25 See supra note 22. 
26 This Article focuses on unification of legal theories across different protected 
classes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related federal statutes. 
Alignment with antidiscrimination standards under the constitutional law of Equal 
Protection is beyond its scope. For a discussion of points of “convergence” and 
“divergence” between Title VII and Equal Protection doctrine, see generally Stephen 
M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 201 (2014). 
27 The Supreme Court has left undisturbed numerous federal circuit court cases 
in which plaintiffs successfully alleged caregiver or transgender discrimination using a 
sex stereotyping theory. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) 
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In Part I, the Article begins with a brief background on how antidis-
crimination efforts have shifted over time, from redressing overt exclu-
sion and harassment in its first three decades, to its second generation 
phase of remedying more subtle discrimination. Part I then identifies 
how litigation strategies for responding to second generation discrimina-
tion forked into three main paths. One path focused on using disparate 
impact and accommodation theories to directly challenge workplace 
structures that fostered discrimination. A second path used the field of 
implicit bias to broaden the concept of intentional discrimination under 
the theory of disparate treatment. As Part I explains, both paths now face 
significant roadblocks erected by recent Supreme Court decisions. Yet a 
third path developed in the context of sex discrimination cases that has 
yet to face similar hurdles: stereotype theory. Part I concludes by docu-
menting the development of this parallel track of litigation which, while 
not entirely unimpeded, has largely withstood the Roberts Court era. 
In Part II, the Article picks up this third path of antidiscrimination 
litigation using stereotype theory, with a focus on plaintiff successes in 
recent sex stereotyping cases. Part II articulates two theoretical and doc-
trinal advances from innovative areas of antidiscrimination law—
caregiver or family responsibilities discrimination and transgender status 
discrimination—and argues that courts can and should apply these ad-
vances to antidiscrimination law across all protected classes. First, recent 
sex stereotyping cases have helped establish that an employee need not 
provide evidence of others outside of the employee’s protected class who 
were treated better to prove intentional discrimination. An employer’s 
adverse action in reliance on impermissible stereotypes may, itself, consti-
tute unlawful discrimination.29 Second, recent sex stereotyping cases have 
recast and broadened the types of evidence that may be persuasive in a 
discrimination case. What courts might once have discounted as mere 
“stray remarks” or not “direct evidence” of a discriminatory motive may 
now be reframed as stereotyping evidence under a stereotype theory of 
liability. These two concepts, of “comparators” and “stray remarks,” are 
doctrinal relics of first generation discrimination law that persist to un-
dermine many plaintiffs’ legitimate second generation claims today. In 
(transgender status discrimination); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 
2009) (caregiver discrimination); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(transgender status discrimination); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (caregiver discrimination). 
28 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989); see infra Part I.B.3. 
29 See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Back, 365 F.3d at 122 (“[S]tereotyping of women 
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-
based motive.”); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] 
(“[W]hile comparative evidence is often useful, it is not necessary to establish a 
violation.”). 
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the context of caregiver and transgender discrimination, however, some 
federal courts have seen beyond these limitations. 
In Part III, the Article turns to why and how stereotype theory has 
had a limited reach beyond the context of sex discrimination. It then 
constructs a universal approach to incorporate developments in this area 
to the rest of antidiscrimination law—first, by showing how unlawful ste-
reotyping may go unrecognized in race discrimination cases, and then, 
by illustrating how stereotyping evidence may help to overcome recent 
constraints imposed on class-wide disparate impact and implicit bias the-
ories by the Supreme Court. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes, evolution in the subset of sex ste-
reotyping cases during an otherwise grim period in the advancement of 
antidiscrimination law has yet to be integrated into mainstream thinking 
about second generation employment discrimination. With disparate 
impact and implicit bias theories now constrained by the Supreme Court, 
the stereotype frame offers plaintiffs a new bridge from first generation 
doctrine to remedying second generation discrimination. It also suggests 
a more coherent, modern approach to redressing continued inequality 
in the workplace that treats long-established social science on gender and 
racial bias equally—an approach that may prevent Title VII from becom-
ing ossified before its work is complete. 
I. THE FRACTURING OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
For the first three decades after Title VII was enacted in 1964, litiga-
tion under the statute made great strides in changing U.S. workplaces by 
rooting out overt discrimination and exclusion. By the mid-1990s, overt 
discrimination had declined dramatically, yet more subtle and structural 
bias remained. Since then, legal theories for pursuing a claim of discrim-
ination have diverged, with plaintiffs following one or more separate 
paths. From the early 1990s until 2005, many federal courts were recep-
tive to arguments based on the changing nature of bias, and modern le-
gal theories for litigating second generation discrimination gained mo-
mentum.30 In the last decade, however, two of the most promising paths 
to redress contemporary discrimination have been severely constrained 
by decisions of the Roberts Court. 
A. The Road to Here: The Emergence of “Second Generation” Discrimination 
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it prohibited both overt discrim-
ination in “terms, conditions, or privileges” of work and the adoption of 
any policies or practices that “deprive[d] any individual of employment 
opportunities” “because of” a protected classification (“race, color, reli-
30 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 250. 
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gion, sex, or national origin”).31 In cases decided throughout the twenty 
years after the statute’s enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
these two parallel enforcement provisions to provide the basis for two 
main causes of action for discrimination—disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact.32 Using a disparate treatment approach, plaintiffs must 
prove that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination against 
them, which plaintiffs can do by providing either direct or circumstantial 
evidence that the employer cannot rebut with a nondiscriminatory justi-
fication.33 Alternatively, using a disparate impact theory, plaintiffs must 
prove that the employer adopted a policy or practice that appeared neu-
tral on its face but that resulted in a disproportionately negative impact 
on members of a protected class, and that the employer’s use of that pol-
icy is not justified by some “business necessity” that a less discriminatory 
policy could not also meet.34 From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, cases 
alleging one or both of these two legal claims made significant headway 
in redressing discrimination and advancing the employment opportuni-
ties of women and racial and ethnic minorities.35 
By the late 1980s, awareness of antidiscrimination laws had become 
widespread and workplaces had been opened up to more diverse work-
forces.36 The manifestations of discriminatory bias moved from exclusion 
at the hiring gate to hostile treatment and exclusion from advancement 
opportunities within the workplace.37 In particular, in the context of the 
protected class of sex, hostile treatment of female employees and atti-
tudes that held women to sex role stereotypes led the Supreme Court to 
recognize two additional ways to prove sex discrimination. In 1986, in 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court recognized that sexual harass-
ment, including creating a hostile work environment that interferes with 
a female employee’s ability to do her job, constitutes discrimination in 
the conditions of work—thus creating the harassment theory of proving 
disparate treatment.38 Three years later, in the 1989 case Price Waterhouse 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
32 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int’l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
33 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 305 n.9; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The specific framework of proof depends on 
whether the case is brought as an individual disparate treatment case or by a class 
alleging that the employer engaged in a “pattern or practice” of intentional 
discrimination. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04 with Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist., 433 U.S. at 304. 
34 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
35 See 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/history/index.html. 
36 See id. 
37 Sturm, supra note 8, at 460. 
38 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986). 
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v. Hopkins, the Court recognized that, where stereotypes of how a female
employee should appear and behave as a woman played a role in an ad-
verse employment decision against her, she could allege sex discrimina-
tion, thus creating the sex stereotype theory of proving disparate treat-
ment.39  Neither harassment nor stereotype theory created a new cause of 
action; instead, both presented new routes for proving disparate treat-
ment that reflected the changing nature of employment discrimination 
more than two decades after the adoption of Title VII.40 
Two years later, based in part on recognition of the concept in the 
Price Waterhouse decision, Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 to allow an additional legal option of alleging a mixed-motive 
theory of disparate treatment.41 Under a mixed-motive approach, a plain-
tiff can allege unlawful discrimination when a protected classification 
played a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision, even if it 
was not the only factor.42 Bolstered by the additional theories of proof for 
harassment, stereotyping, and mixed-motives, disparate treatment and 
disparate impact claims continued to redress employment discrimination 
throughout the 1990s.43 
Yet by the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, advances in workplace 
equality appeared to have stalled.44 Disparities in employment equality 
for women and racial minorities continued to persist, particularly appar-
ent in unequal compensation and the lack of diversity at the middle and 
top of organizations—disparities that continue today.45 Despite the de-
velopment of additional legal theories of proof, scholars and employee 
advocates began to identify that the operation of bias ran deeper, was 
more ingrained and entrenched in ways that existing theories of Title VII 
were still unable to reach. In an influential article published in 2001, Su-
san Sturm put a name to this phenomenon: “second generation” discrim-
ination.46 
Since then, numerous scholars have identified the features of second 
generation discrimination (also referred to as “structural” employment 
39 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
40 Also, neither hostile treatment nor stereotyping were always actionable: hostile 
treatment had to be based on a protected class and be severe or pervasive enough to 
interfere with work to constitute discrimination, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 67, and 
protected class stereotypes had to actually play a role in an adverse employment 
decision to violate Title VII, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
41 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, S. 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). 
42 Id. 
43 See 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, supra note 35. 
44 See supra notes 15–19. 
45 Id. 
46 Sturm, supra note 8, at 460. 
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discrimination);47 virtually all employment discrimination claims today 
involve some second generation components.48 Second generation dis-
crimination involves bias that is more subtle, suppressed, and implicit—as 
opposed to explicit or recognized by those who hold it—which means it 
is often hidden or covert and harder to prove.49 (For example, implicit 
biases about gender may affect how a manager perceives an employee’s 
performance: the manager assesses an assertive male employee as a 
“leader,” but an assertive female employee as “difficult” or “bossy.”)50 
Second generation discrimination may also be diffuse and structural, 
embedded in a variety of workplace practices, which means that it is 
harder to pinpoint as discrete and may compound over time.51 (Continu-
ing with the example, based on the manager’s assessment, the manager 
appoints the male employee as team leader to develop his potential and 
encourages the female employee to develop her collaboration skills. 
Based on this feedback, the male employee reaches for challenging as-
signments while the female employee spends significant time doing sup-
port work for the team.) Lastly, second generation discrimination may be 
relational, interactional, and contextual, meaning that it is fostered by 
workplace relationships and culture.52 (In the example, when the male 
employee, having shown initiative as a team leader, gets selected for a 
plum assignment, the female employee picks up the slack so the team will 
succeed. When the opportunity for a promotion arises, if both employees 
have similar education and years at work, which is more likely to be 
judged better qualified for the promotion?) 
These complexities make second generation discrimination difficult 
to litigate under statutory doctrine developed in the 1960s. In particular, 
as discussed in Part II, below, two outdated concepts developed through 
case law redressing first generation cases remain enmeshed in Title VII 
doctrine, posing hurdles to plaintiffs challenging modern discrimination: 
the “comparator requirement” that expects a similarly situated employee 
47 See id. 
48 See, e.g., id. at 479; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2006); Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 131; Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 11, at 
998–99. 
49 See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 5–10; Krieger, supra 
note 9, at 1164–65, 1241. 
50 See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes 
Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Social Issues 666–69 (2001); 
Ban Bossy: Leadership Tips for Managers, LeanIn.org & Girl Scouts of USA, http:// 
banbossy.com/wp-content/themes/leanin/ui/microsite/ban-bossy/resources/Ban_ 
Bossy_Leadership_Tips_for_managers.pdf?v=1&77f96d. 
51 See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 12–13; Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 99; Sturm, supra note 8, at 468–69. 
52 See, e.g., Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 92; Sturm, 
supra note 8, at 470–71. 
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outside the plaintiff’s protected class who was treated better than the 
plaintiff,53 and the “stray remarks” doctrine that discounts potentially use-
ful evidence of stereotypical thinking where it is deemed to be too re-
moved from the adverse employment action in question.54 
What is more, despite the significant shift in how unlawful bias mani-
fests itself in the workplace today, with one small exception,55 Congress 
has made no amendment to Title VII since 1991. Thus, for Title VII to 
continue to be useful in advancing equality at work, modernization of the 
doctrine has had to occur through the interpretation of the law by the 
federal courts. 
B. Forks and Roadblocks: Three Paths for Litigating Second Generation 
Discrimination 
Over the past 15 years, scholars and employee advocates have worked 
to frame litigation under the existing doctrine of Title VII to reach bias 
in its modern forms. Three main paths for litigating second generation 
claims have emerged.56 One path attacks the workplace practices that 
support second generation discrimination head on, using structural liti-
gation theories including disparate impact and accommodation. A sec-
ond path focuses on using disparate treatment theory to unmask and 
hold the employer accountable for its policies that allow the operation of 
unchecked implicit biases in the workplace. While both of these ap-
proaches have provided doctrinal advancements and been met with some 
success, in recent years, both have been constrained by decisions of the 
Roberts Court.57 A third path focuses on how impermissible stereotypes 
factor into workplace decisions and cultures, resulting in unlawful dis-
53 See infra Part II.A.1. 
54 See infra Part II.B.1. 
55 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–12, 123 Stat. 5–7 
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)) (extending time period for filing pay 
discrimination complaints). 
56 Note that this Article focuses on litigation paths under Title VII, but much 
scholarship has been devoted to ways to reduce and redress second generation 
discrimination outside of the context of litigation—for example, through regulatory, 
employer-driven, tort, and corporate law approaches. See, e.g., Richard Thompson 
Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1381, 
1420 (2014); Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 144–51; 
Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer 
Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 903–04 (2007); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding 
Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1648 
(2007); Sandra E. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 
Ala. L. Rev. 773, 786 (2010); Sturm, supra note 8, at 459–65. In fact, Susan Sturm’s 
germinal article suggested the limits of a litigation-focused approach. See id. at 475–
78. Discussion of this scholarship is beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on
currently available paths of litigation. 
57 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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crimination. This stereotyping approach has also advanced the law, and 
has not been similarly restricted by the Court. It has, however, had lim-
ited application beyond the protected classification of sex, which suggests 
the potential for its future expansion. 
1. Structural Litigation and Disparate Impact Theory
One path for responding to second generation discrimination is to 
directly litigate the workplace structures that foster second generation 
discrimination. A decade ago, in separate works, Charles Sullivan and 
Samuel Bagenstos suggested this could be accomplished by using argua-
bly more “structural” theories of litigation, including disparate impact 
claims, disparate treatment claims for denial of accommodation, and ef-
forts at affirmative action.58  The significant benefit of this approach is 
that it limits the need for a plaintiff to prove that an employer has acted 
with discriminatory intent—the most difficult part of litigating second 
generation claims, in which biases are often implicit.59 
Indeed, decisions by the Roberts Court have borne out the partial 
success of this strategy. In addition to the main disparate treatment and 
disparate impact prohibitions described above,60 Title VII includes two 
express accommodation requirements: for discrimination because of sex, 
that pregnant employees be treated “the same” as all other employees 
“similar in their ability or inability to work”;61 for religious discrimination, 
that an employer “reasonably accommodate . . . an employ-
ee’s . . . religious observance or practice” unless it poses an “undue hard-
ship” on the business.62 In two decisions in its 2015 term, the Supreme 
Court interpreted these provisions at least partially in favor of employees 
seeking such accommodations.63 To the extent that a denial of accom-
modation in either of these circumstances reflects second generation dis-
crimination—for example, a work policy of denying routine accommoda-
tions to only pregnant workers based on implicit assumptions that work 
and pregnancy are incompatible—this approach provides some redress.64 
58 Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 16–18; Sullivan, Disparate 
Impact, supra note 11, at 984–996. 
59 See Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 44–45; Sullivan, Disparate 
Impact, supra note 11, at 937–38. 
60 See supra Part I.A. 
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
63 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015); 
see also Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as it Approaches 
Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 849–60 (2016). 
64 For a proposal to apply an accommodation approach to all sex and gender 
discrimination cases, see Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 Duke L.J. 
891 (2014).  
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Yet the more broad-reaching theory of disparate impact and related 
efforts at affirmative action have not fared so well. To begin with, as Sulli-
van, Bagenstos, and others acknowledge, the disparate impact framework 
generally appeals less to plaintiffs because it provides no right to a jury 
trial and limited remedies (compensatory and punitive damages are only 
available for intentional discrimination under Title VII), and because the 
employer has a broad affirmative defense where any policy that results in 
a disparate impact serves a legitimate “business necessity.”65 That said, 
plaintiffs have successfully litigated disparate impact claims that chal-
lenge workplace structures that may foster second generation discrimina-
tion—for example, the practice of using subjective decision-making for 
promotions66 and policies limiting the use of sick days that disadvantage 
family caregivers.67 
More problematic is the Roberts Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. 
DeStefano circumscribing the reach of disparate impact and limiting its 
use to accomplish any sort of affirmative effort toward workplace equali-
ty.68 In Ricci, the Court held that a fire department with a long history of 
racial discrimination in hiring went too far when it threw out the results 
of an employment test that showed a significant disparate impact on Afri-
can-American applicants.69 When white applicants sued to force the de-
partment to reinstate the test results, the Court majority perceived the 
fire department’s actions as disparate treatment against the white appli-
cants.70 The Court created a new, heightened standard within disparate 
impact analysis, forcing an employer to, in effect, prove that its policy or 
practice created a disparate impact before the employer can take any 
such affirmative measures.71 With this, the Court majority hamstrung the 
reach of disparate impact, while evincing its general hostility toward the 
theory except as a way to expose or “smoke out” hidden intentional dis-
crimination.72 
65 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Bagenstos, The 
Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 21–24; Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 11, at 
968, 993. See generally Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. Rev. 701 (2006) (describing disparate impact’s limitations). 
66 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
67 See Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rule 
prohibiting leave in excess of ten days as applied to pregnant woman); Roberts v. U.S. 
Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (policy that employees could 
not use sick days to care for sick children). 
68 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009). 
69 Id. at 585. 
70 Id. at 593. 
71 Id. at 584. 
72 Id. at 595 (Scalia, J. concurring) (“It might be possible to defend the law by 
framing it as simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional 
discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment. . . . But arguably the 
disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly to be fairly characterized in such a 
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Worth noting, however, is that in the 2015 case Texas Department of 
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,73 the 
Court held, by reference to Title VII, that disparate impact claims were 
available under the analogous Federal Housing Act. This decision indi-
cates that, despite constraints placed on disparate impact in Ricci and 
warnings by Justice Scalia of a coming conflict with Equal Protection 
law,74 disparate impact theory survives another day.  Yet, in writing for the 
Texas Department of Housing Court majority, Justice Kennedy was careful to 
both avoid constitutional matters and continue to read disparate impact 
narrowly, warning that disparate impact remedies should “strive 
to . . . eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means” and be 
mindful not to “perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move 
beyond them.”75 Thus, while not entirely lost, the disparate impact path 
for remedying second generation discrimination has been narrowed.76 
2. Implicit Bias and Social Framework Theory
The second path for responding to second generation discrimina-
tion at work is to allege disparate treatment under Title VII and use the 
social science of implicit bias to create an inference of discriminatory in-
tent. Linda Krieger first articulated this theory in a path-breaking article 
published in 1995.77 Since then, numerous scholars in both law and social 
science have contributed to its development and popularization.78 Under 
fashion. . . .” (citations omitted)). 
73 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015). 
74 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
75 Tex. Dep’t of Hous., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
76 See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlife, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (2015) 
(discussing disparate impact’s continued viability); Richard A. Primus, Of Visible Race-
Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection and Disparate Impact after Ricci and 
Inclusive Communities, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act After 50 Years: Proceedings 
of the New York University 67th Annual Conference on Labor, 295–318 (2015) 
(same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and 
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2016) (same). 
77 See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1164–65. 
78 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 
1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 477 (2007); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good 
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 
Va. L. Rev. 1893 (2009); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from 
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Deepening 
the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
747 (2001); Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9; Melissa Hart, 
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 741 (2005); 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969 
(2006); Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124 (2012); 
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1003 
n.21 (2006) (cataloguing the literature on implicit bias); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La
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this approach, evidence on the operation of implicit biases—that is, bias-
es and associations that affect our perceptions and judgments without 
our conscious awareness—is offered to create an inference of intentional 
discrimination when workplace decisions have discriminatory results, but 
the decision makers do not believe they harbor animus.79 Implicit bias ev-
idence has been used in individual cases and, more commonly, in com-
bination with what is known as “social framework” evidence on the types 
of organizational structures that are more likely to activate decision mak-
ers’ implicit biases, to allege class-wide pattern or practice discrimina-
tion.80 Where an employer relies on work structures known to activate un-
lawful implicit biases—for example, unchecked subjective decision-
making for promotions—and there are statistical disparities by protected 
class in that workforce, this theory argues, the employer should be held 
liable for intentional discrimination for failing to prevent or correct the 
operation of implicit bias.81 The significant appeal of this approach is that 
it actually addresses part of the underlying cause of second generation 
discrimination. A number of federal courts have agreed and upheld 
plaintiffs’ cases using implicit bias to allege discrimination on the basis of 
sex or race.82 
Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415 
(2000); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent 
Mistakes,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 481 (2002); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 
61 La. L. Rev. 495 (2001). But see, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1023 (2006); Amy 
L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999); Amy L. Wax, The 
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979 (2008). 
79 See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1179–80; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 78, at 1004. 
80 See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 78, at 1005. 
81 See id. at 1052–53. 
82 See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that unlawful discrimination can stem from 
stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus”) 
(race discrimination); see also Burns v. Johnson, 2016 WL 3675157, *7 (1st Cir. July 
11, 2016) (“As this circuit has repeatedly held, stereotyping, cognitive bias, and 
certain other ‘more subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perception and 
judgments’ also fall within the ambit of Title VII's prohibition” (quoting Thomas, 183 
F.3d at 61))(sex discrimination); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1265, 1272 
(10th Cir. 1988) (sex discrimination); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Inland 
Marine Indust., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984) (race discrimination); Dow v. 
Donovan, 150 F. Supp. 2d, 249, 263–64 (D. Mass. 2001) (sex discrimination); Kimble 
v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F.Supp.2d 765, 775–78 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (race
discrimination). But see, e.g., Tucker v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2009 WL 2135807, *6 
(S.D. Ga. 2009) (“At least in this Circuit, a ‘subtle bias’ claim based on subconscious 
cognitive stereotypes is not tenable as a disparate treatment claim”). Courts have also 
recognized the operation of age-related stereotypes in cases alleging disparate 
treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621–34. See, 
e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1993); Brooks v. Woodline
Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Synock v. Milwaukee 
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Yet despite initial success, this approach now faces an uphill battle. 
After growing in popularity and acceptance, in both practice and the 
courts, the social framework piece of the implicit bias theory has suffered 
a steady backlash from a small group of academics who oppose it, includ-
ing the coiners of the term “social frameworks.”83 An academic backlash 
in and of itself may pose no threat to a legal theory, but federal courts—
including the U.S. Supreme Court—have taken notice.84 In its 2011 deci-
sion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court rejected certification of a nationwide 
class of plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotion result-
ing from widespread unchecked biased subjective decision making.85 
While the Wal-Mart decision focused on class certification only, in decid-
ing whether the plaintiff class met the test for “commonality” under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court took a swipe at the implicit bias 
social framework theory more generally. The Court rejected the plain-
tiffs’ expert social framework evidence, noting that because the expert 
could not specify what percentage of decisions at the company were infect-
ed by implicit bias, the testimony “[did] nothing to advance [the plain-
tiffs’] case” and the Court could “safely disregard” it.86 Ultimately, the 
Court viewed the case as lacking the commonality necessary to support 
class certification because it sought to aggregate the harms of “literally 
millions of employment decisions at once . . . [w]ithout some glue hold-
ing the alleged reasons for all those decisions together.”87 In a symposium 
on the future of systemic disparate treatment in the wake of the Wal-Mart 
decision, Michael Selmi, Noah Zatz, and Tristin Green, in separate piec-
es, each identified the challenge moving forward as identifying a way to 
hold the employer entity liable for intentional discrimination based on 
individual employment decisions infected with implicit bias.88 To suc-
ceed, Selmi and Zatz suggested, future cases would need greater “con-
nective tissue” or a more “coherent narrative” of discrimination for plain-
tiffs to prevail.89 
Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981)); Rand v. New Hampton Sch., 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6188, *15 (D.N.H. Apr. 24, 2000). 
83 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 n.8 (2011); see Mitchell & 
Tetlock, supra note 78, at 1055; John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, 
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 Va. 
L. Rev. 1715 (2008). 
84 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 n.8. 
85 Id. at 2550–61. 
86 Id. at 2554. 
87 Id. at 2552. 
88 Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berkeley J. 
Emp. & Lab. L. 395, 397 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment 
Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 477, 481 (2011); Noah D. 
Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 387, 388 (2011). 
89 Selmi, Theorizing, supra note 88, at 481; Zatz, supra note 88, at 388. 
LCB_20_3_Art_04_Bornstein_Complete (Do Not Delete) 10/24/2016  8:29 AM 
2016] UNIFYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 937 
Yet also worth noting is the uniqueness of the Wal-Mart case: the case 
came before the Court on class certification, not a substantive decision 
on the merits, and it was the largest class action ever attempted, alleging 
a pattern or practice of discrimination across a massive nationwide com-
pany affecting 1.5 million class members.90 This means that plaintiffs can, 
and do, continue to make use of implicit bias evidence to help create an 
inference of discrimination in cases that can be distinguished from the 
behemoth Wal-Mart case—for example, where fewer managers are re-
sponsible for discriminatory decisions shaped by the employer entity.91 
Cases relying on this theory of proof, however, likely need more now; this 
once-promising path for remedying second generation discrimination 
has been seriously constrained. 
3. Stereotype Theory
The third path for litigating modern forms of employment discrimi-
nation is to allege disparate treatment under a stereotype theory, by argu-
ing that an adverse employment decision was made because of the opera-
tion of stereotypes92 associated with a protected class. The legal theory of 
sex stereotyping as a form of discrimination originated with early Equal 
Protection doctrine in the context of constitutional law.93 In a series of 
cases conceived of and litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her role as 
the head of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project during the 1970s, the Su-
preme Court held that, where state or federal law treated men and wom-
en differently based on sex stereotypes, such laws violated the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of Equal Protection.94 Through these cases, the Court 
recognized that differential treatment based on assumptions about how 
people will or should behave because of their sex—for example, laws that 
entitled women, but not men, to a caregiver tax credit and presumed that 
90 See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
91 See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 520–21 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-06950-LBS-JCF, 2012 WL 
2912741, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012); see also supra Part.III.C.1. 
92 The term “stereotype” has been attributed to Walter Lippman, who, in 1922, 
used print-setting terminology as an analogy to describe fixed “pictures in our heads.” 
Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 658 (2013) 
(citing Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion 3, 89–90 (1922)). The term was more 
precisely defined for the purposes of social psychology in 1954 by Gordon Allport: 
“Whether favorable or unfavorable, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated 
with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that 
category.” Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 191 (1954).  
93 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family 
Conflicts of Men, 63 Hastings L.J. 1297, 1306–09 (2012); see also Cary Franklin, The 
Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 
120 (2010); Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1348–52 (2012). 
94 See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1306–09. 
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men, not women, should serve as estate administrators—constituted un-
constitutional sex discrimination.95 
While references to stereotypes appeared in Title VII cases contem-
poraneously with these developments under Equal Protection law in the 
1970s,96 a sex stereotyping theory of liability under Title VII first ap-
peared in the 1989 Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.97 
When plaintiff Ann Hopkins, an outstanding employee who was denied a 
promotion to partner, alleged that the denial was motivated at least in 
part due to her failure to conform to stereotypes about how she should 
appear and behave because she was a woman, the Supreme Court 
agreed.98 The Court found evidence that the decision makers criticized 
her for being too “macho” and “masculine,” and suggested that, to im-
prove her chances at partnership, she should appear and behave more 
“femininely,” constituted evidence of sex stereotyping to support a claim 
of sex discrimination.99 “[I]n forbidding employers to discriminate 
against individuals because of their sex,” the Court held, “Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”100 Yet merely holding or even ex-
pressing stereotypical beliefs in the workplace did not, alone, violate Title 
VII, the Court noted.101 To be actionable, a plaintiff must show that the 
employer “actually relied on her gender in making its decision,” which 
Hopkins had proven by showing that assessment of her work perfor-
mance was impermissibly influenced by her failure to conform to sex ste-
reotype.102 
So defined, stereotype theory is a way to frame disparate treatment 
that can reach second generation discrimination by exposing how work-
place structures rely on stereotypes associated with protected class status 
to disadvantage members of that class. In this way, the legal theory of ste-
reotyping overlaps with, but is distinct from, implicit bias social frame-
work theory. Implicit or cognitive bias is a broad social scientific concept 
identifying and documenting how past experiences or opinions shape a 
person’s current thought processes without the person’s conscious 
awareness.103 It encompasses multiple aspects and sources of bias, of 
95 See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1302–06 (discussing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971) and Moritz v. C.I.R., 469 F.2d. 466 (10th Cir. 1972)). 
96 See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 681–82 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
97 490 U.S. 228, 250–55 (1989); see supra Part I.A. 
98 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 251. 
99 Id. at 235. 
100 Id. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198).  
101 Id. 
102 Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 92, at 682–83. 
103 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
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which stereotypes are just one.104 Where unrecognized by the holder, ste-
reotypes are a subset of the larger concept of implicit bias; but stereotyp-
ing may also be closer to the consciousness of the holder, who believes it 
to be benign.105 Thus, while stereotyping evidence may be relevant to both 
theories for litigating discrimination under Title VII, their framing of 
such evidence varies. Social framework theory posits that, where work-
place statistics show discrimination and workplace policies are likely to 
activate implicit bias, an employer entity intentionally discriminates by 
failing to prevent or correct for the implicit biases of its individual deci-
sion makers.106 Stereotype theory posits, similarly, that an employer entity 
is liable for individual decisions infected by unlawful stereotypes, whether 
implicitly or more consciously; but it also exposes how workplaces are de-
signed around norms and cultures that favor certain protected classes.107 
Implicit bias and social framework concepts most commonly arise in class 
cases, while stereotyping most commonly arises in individual cases. But, 
as discussed in Part III, below, stereotype theory may offer a framing that 
bolsters class cases alleged under class-based implicit bias disparate 
treatment and disparate impact theories.108 
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4, 4–6 (1995). A general 
discussion of implicit or cognitive bias is beyond the scope of this Article. For more 
on this topic, see the sources listed supra note 78. 
104 See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 103, at 4–6 (identifying and discussing 
three key categories of implicit cognition: “attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes”); 
Kang, et al., supra note 78, at 1132–35 (describing the difference between explicit, 
concealed, and implicit attitudes and stereotypes). 
105 See Kang, et al., supra note 78, at 1132–35; Michael Selmi, The Evolution of 
Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 Wis. 
L. Rev. 937, 978–79 (2014) (“As may be apparent, [implicit bias] theories are also 
closely related to the concept of stereotyping; indeed, stereotyping likely explains at 
least some significant portion of the IAT [Implicit Association Test] results. There is 
extensive literature going back decades on stereotyping, and there are different 
forms, some more innocuous than others. At least in one respect stereotyping is an 
overbroad group judgment applied to individuals, and today it seems to have its 
strongest effect as applied to gender where stereotypes abound.”); Joan C. Williams, 
The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination 
Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 401, 442 (2003) 
(“[C]ognitive bias is a generic term, which includes many situations that involve 
stereotyping. Surely commentators cannot mean that stereotyping should not give 
rise to liability: the Supreme Court established the relevance of stereotyping evidence 
in glass ceiling cases in 1989, and in maternal wall cases in 2003” (citations omitted)). 
106 See, e.g., Green, A Structural Approach, supra note 56, at 855. 
107 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and 
Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1338–39 (2008) (“When a workplace is designed 
around masculine norms, gender stereotypes arise in everyday workplace 
interactions: . . . women can and do successfully litigate sex discrimination by using 
the stereotypes that arise in everyday interactions as evidence of gender bias.”). 
108 See infra Part III.C. 
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Since Price Waterhouse, the use of stereotyping to allege disparate 
treatment under Title VII has gained prominence, most successfully in 
second generation cases alleging sex discrimination.109 Noting its rise, le-
gal scholars tracing the development of the sex stereotype theory have 
attempted to define its contours.110 Anita Bernstein has suggested that 
U.S. law finds stereotyping unlawful where stereotypes operate as a con-
straint on individual freedom.111 Thus, while stereotyping is “a technology 
of actionable discrimination” and “a mode by which injustice gains ef-
fect,” the law would benefit from clarity that stereotyping is unlawful only 
where it constrains individuals.112 Kerri Stone has described stereotyping 
doctrine as lacking in definition and uniformity, leading to disparate re-
sults in the many cases citing to Price Waterhouse.113 To remedy this lack of 
precision, Stone suggests that courts determine if a stereotype is “in play” 
(“voiced or somehow acted upon” as opposed to “offhand”) and, if so, if 
there is a “sufficient nexus” between that stereotype and the adverse em-
ployment action.114 And, despite its expansion of the protected class of 
“sex” to include gender identity (and possibly sexual orientation), Kim-
berly Yuracko has argued that stereotype theory has failed to live up to its 
transformative promise of sex neutrality and freedom from gender con-
straints at work.115 Instead, Yuracko posits, stereotype theory has served 
primarily as a burden-shifting mechanism that, for a plaintiff to use suc-
cessfully, risks re-inscribing gender differences.116 
Indeed, the reach of the stereotype theory has not been universal—
most notably, as Yuracko has documented, in its inability to prohibit 
109 See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 681–84, 689 (describing “the rise of 
stereotyping as a strong legal claim post-Price Waterhouse, in an era when plaintiffs 
fared worse elsewhere in employment law”); Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 
59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 591, 656 (2011). 
110 See Bernstein, supra note 92; Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109; 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 757 (2013). 
111 See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 671. 
112 Id. at 687, 715–21. 
113 Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109, at 594, 621. 
114 Id. at 634–56. 
115 See Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 110, at 758–62, 770–71. For further 
discussion of the application of sex stereotype theory to cases alleging sexual 
orientation discrimination, see generally, for example, Zachary R. Herz, Price’s 
Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396 
(2014); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title 
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the 
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (2014); William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back 
to Title VII: A Case for Redefining ‘Because of Sex’ to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual 
Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL L. REV. 487 (2011); Ann C. McGinley, Erasing 
Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 713 (2010). But see infra note 182. 
116 See id. at 786–87. 
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physical assimilation demands, like sex-differentiated dress and grooming 
codes.117 Yet despite its variation and limitations, the potential of using 
stereotype theory as a framing device to help plaintiffs prove many types 
of second generation discrimination remains largely undiminished. No-
tably, in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court did not limit the application 
of stereotyping evidence to a particular protected class, yet stereotype 
theory has been used primarily to allege discrimination on the basis of 
sex.118 And, unlike both disparate impact theory and implicit bias social 
framework theory, the U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in to limit 
the stereotype path, despite the fact that several appellate courts have 
adapted and expanded its Price Waterhouse decision in significant new 
ways.119 Over the past decade, during the same time period in which the 
Roberts Court narrowed disparate impact and implicit bias theories (and 
employment discrimination protections overall),120 innovative discrimina-
tion cases alleging a sex stereotyping theory have gained success in feder-
al district and appellate courts, suggesting a way forward for all modern 
claims of discrimination. 
II. THE UNIFYING LESSONS OF SEX STEREOTYPING CASES
The unusual success of cases alleging sex stereotyping in the last 
decade, during a period in which other popular theories for litigating 
second generation discrimination were limited by the Supreme Court, 
provides an opportunity for reflection. What about sex stereotyping cases 
led to plaintiffs’ successes? Indeed, such cases may be unique in that they 
involve more marginalized groups within a protected class for whom ste-
reotyping evidence is still often surprisingly open.121 This overt treatment 
of plaintiffs harkens back to the first generation of antidiscrimination 
lawsuits. 
Yet caregiver and transgender discrimination cases also push the 
boundaries of what constitutes discrimination “because of sex” in new 
117 See id. at 788–94; Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex 
Before Race?, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1–19 (2010); see also, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006). 
118 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“By focusing on 
Hopkins’ specific proof, . . . we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of 
proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision”); see 
also infra Part III.A. 
119 See supra note 27. 
120 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
121 For example, one employer in a sex stereotyping case told a transgender 
plaintiff that it was “inappropriate,” “unsettling,” and “unnatural” for the plaintiff, 
born biologically male, to present as a woman. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314 
(11th Cir. 2011). Another employer told a visibly pregnant woman, “I was going to 
put you in charge of that office, but look at you now.” Moore v. Ala. State Univ., 980 
F. Supp. 426, 431 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
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and contemporary ways—making them a sort of bridge between first and 
second generation forms of discrimination. While the stereotyping evi-
dence may be easier to spot in such cases, the development of the legal 
framework applied to this evidence is decidedly modern—and translatable 
to cases alleging discrimination on other protected bases. 
Two developments in the law stand out: (1) a route for creating an 
inference of discrimination without “comparator” evidence, and (2) a 
way to include, as stereotyping evidence, evidence that might otherwise 
be discounted as “stray remarks.” To date, these advances have not been 
broadly applied to employment discrimination law as a whole. This is a 
mistake, this Part argues: the social science on bias should be recognized 
similarly, regardless of protected class. Sex stereotyping cases provide 
valuable insights into the operation of bias in its modern forms that can 
provide coherence and continued relevance to all litigation under Title 
VII. 
A. A Bridge from Comparators to Comparisons 
First generation case law suggested that to prove intentional discrim-
ination, an employee plaintiff must point to a similarly situated coworker 
outside of the plaintiff’s protected class (i.e., of a different race, sex, na-
tional origin) who was treated better than the plaintiff. Over time, such 
“comparator” evidence became expected and even required by some 
federal courts, posing a challenge for plaintiffs alleging second genera-
tion discrimination, particularly in an era of occupational segregation.122 
Yet through a series of recent sex stereotyping decisions, the so-called 
comparator “requirement” has evolved to allow plaintiffs with stereotyp-
ing evidence to create an inference of discrimination even when they 
lack comparators. 
1. The “Comparator Requirement”
Shortly after the enactment of Title VII, in the 1973 case McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, the U.S. Supreme Court set out its now well-known 
three-stage burden-shifting framework for proving a circumstantial case 
of intentional employment discrimination.123 The employee plaintiff 
must first establish a rebuttable presumption of discrimination by making 
out a four-pronged prima facie case; the burden then shifts in the second 
stage to the employer defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse action it took against the plaintiff; and, in the 
third stage, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the de-
fendant’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.124 
122 See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
123 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
124 Id. at 802–04. 
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In illustrating how to meet this framework, the Court suggested that 
comparative evidence could be relevant at both the first and third stages. 
In the first stage, to prove his prima facie case of race discrimination in 
hiring, the plaintiff must show not only that he (1) was a member of a 
protected class (here, an African-American), (2) applied and was quali-
fied for the position, and (3) was not hired, but also that (4) the job re-
mained open to applicants with similar qualifications.125 And in the third 
stage of the burden-shifting framework, comparative evidence could help 
prove pretext. Where the defendant in McDonnell Douglas had cited the 
plaintiff’s civil rights protests against it as its legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the Court explained that “evidence 
that white employees involved in acts . . . of comparable serious-
ness . . . were nevertheless retained or rehired” would be “[e]specially 
relevant” to proving pretext.126 
While suggesting the value of comparative evidence, the Court cau-
tioned, in a footnote, that because facts vary in discrimination cases, the 
formulation of the four prongs of the prima facie case “is not necessarily 
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”127 It reiterated 
this point several years later in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, noting 
that the proof described in McDonnell Douglas “was not intended to be an 
inflexible rule,” but rather to establish that, in the prima facie stage, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of creating an inference that the defendant’s 
actions were based on discrimination.128 The Supreme Court also cited 
comparative proof in the 1976 case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transpor-
tation Co.: while looking to whether an employee outside of the protected 
class was treated better than the plaintiff when both had engaged in 
workplace misconduct of “comparable seriousness,” the Court noted that 
an inference of discrimination did not require “precise equivalence in 
culpability.”129 
Despite the Supreme Court’s caveats, over the next three decades, 
lower federal courts interpreted the role of comparative evidence to de-
velop what is now known as the “comparator requirement.”130 In a num-
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 804. 
127 Id. at 802 n.13. 
128 Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–76 (1978) (“[A] Title VII 
plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer from 
which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than 
not that such actions were ‘based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.’” 
(citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977))). 
129 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976). 
130 See Dianne Avery et al., Employment Discrimination Law: Cases and 
Materials on Equality in the Workplace 111–13 (8th ed. 2010); Bornstein, supra 
note 93, at 1327–33, 1338–39; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 
Yale L.J. 728, 745 (2011); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated 
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ber of federal courts, a plaintiff may only succeed in proving the pretext 
stage of an employment discrimination case by providing evidence that a 
coworker from outside of the relevant protected class (a “comparator”) 
was treated better—for example, that a woman alleging that she was de-
nied a promotion because of sex discrimination show that the promotion 
went to a man, or that a Latino alleging national origin discrimination 
prevented his hire show that a white candidate got the job instead.131 In 
several federal courts, this comparator requirement comes even earlier, 
as a necessary component for a plaintiff to meet the fourth prong of his 
first stage prima facie case.132 
Moreover, in jurisdictions that require comparator evidence, the 
mandate that a comparator be “similarly situated” has also proved limit-
ing to plaintiffs. Court interpretations vary as to what makes a given com-
parator similar enough to the plaintiff to infer discrimination based on the 
difference in the parties’ protected class status.133 Yet some courts require 
the plaintiff be “nearly identical” to the comparator before the plaintiff 
will be entitled to an inference of discrimination.134 
To be sure, other federal courts have properly understood that com-
parators are one, but not the only, way for a plaintiff to create an infer-
ence of discrimination—the Supreme Court’s ultimate purpose in creat-
ing the plaintiff’s prima facie case.135 Yet for discrimination plaintiffs in 
those courts that adhere to the comparator requirement, the ability to 
provide a convincing comparator can often be determinative.136 
The comparator requirement is an outdated remnant of first genera-
tion discrimination doctrine that fails to recognize how bias operates in 
modern workplaces, thus unnecessarily curbing the ability of Title VII to 
Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 831, 839 (2002); Charles A. 
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 
191, 203 (2009); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1350–52.  
131 See Avery et al., supra note 130, at 111–13; Goldberg, supra note 130, at 747 
n.49 (citing cases in the 2d, 6th, and 8th Circuits); Sullivan, The Phoenix, supra note
130, at 194, 208 (as cited in Goldberg). 
132 Avery et al., supra note 130, at 111–12; Goldberg, supra note 130, at 747 n.48 
(citing cases in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits). 
133 Avery et al., supra note 130, at 112–13. 
134 Id. at 112–13 (citing Perez v Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 213 
(5th Cir. 2004)).  
135 Id. 
136 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 130, at 750 (“In much of discrimination 
law . . . comparators have taken on an importance beyond their service as a 
potentially useful heuristic for seeing discrimination. They constitute, to many courts, 
a threshold requirement of a discrimination claim and, in that sense, part of 
discrimination’s very definition. On this view, discrimination occurs only when an 
actor has differentiated between two groups of people because of a protected trait, 
which means that the absence of a comparator signals the absence of discrimination.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
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redress second generation discrimination.137 Modern scientific under-
standings of stereotyping tell us that unlawful biases based on a person’s 
sex, race, or national origin may play a role in employment decision re-
gardless of how the decision maker treats other employees.138 An example 
of this phenomenon is the success of a member of a protected class who 
is perceived to be, in the words of Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, “ra-
cially palatable” (“good black”) rather than “racially salient” (“too 
black”).139 If one African-American employee whose appearance or man-
ner seems more “palatable” to the white working culture of the employer 
receives a promotion, that should not bar the discrimination claim of an-
other African-American employee whose race is more “salient” (i.e., “too 
black”). If one employee is disadvantaged by racial stereotypes, that is 
discriminatory, even if others are not. 
The comparator requirement also poses a particular problem to re-
dressing unlawful discrimination in an economy marked by steep occupa-
tional segregation. A plaintiff who works in a heavily segregated occupa-
tion (for example, a dental hygienist who believes she experienced sex 
discrimination) may not be able to provide comparator evidence of 
someone outside of the protected class who was treated better than she 
(in the example, a man) because none exists (in 2015, 96.4% of dental 
hygienists were women).140 Yet even in an all-female work environment, 
one female employee can experience sex discrimination when she is pe-
nalized in relation to gender stereotypes when others are not—for exam-
ple, if she is perceived as too feminine or nice or, conversely, too mascu-
line or aggressive, to be promoted. 
2. Caregiver Discrimination Without Comparators
In a series of cases in which plaintiffs alleged that they were discrim-
inated against on the basis of their family caregiving responsibilities, a 
number of courts have exposed the fallacy of the comparator require-
137 See, e.g., id. at 753–72 (detailing the many problems that requiring a 
comparator poses for both first and second generation discrimination cases). 
138  See, e.g., ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206–
44 (1977) (discussing “tokenism”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black 
Woman, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719–28 (2001) (discussing intra-group 
differences and “identity performance”); see also, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 
F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscrimination against one employee cannot be 
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that same group” 
(citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982), Brown v. Henderson, 257 
F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.2001)). 
139  See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White? 
Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America 1–20 (2013) (describing and 
documenting the idea of racial performance and “Working Identity”). 
140 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Ann. Averages tbl.11 
(2015), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf. (Employed persons by detailed 
occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity).  
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ment, holding clearly that a plaintiff alleging sex stereotyping need not 
provide evidence of a comparator to create an inference of discrimina-
tion.141 The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a 
plaintiff—a mother who was told that mothers should “do the right 
thing” and stay home—could create an inference of sex discrimination 
without providing comparator evidence because an employer’s “veiled 
assertion that mothers . . . are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work 
and motherhood are incompatible” is inherently “gender-based” treat-
ment, thus “properly addressed under Title VII.”142 Another federal dis-
trict court in Illinois allowed an inference of discrimination despite the 
lack of a comparator when the plaintiff was denied a traveling sales posi-
tion for which she applied based on the assumption that, as a new moth-
er, she would not want to travel.143 The Seventh Circuit held similarly in 
two cases—one in which a new mother was fired and her employer sug-
gested it would give her more time at home with her children,144 and an-
other in which a mother who specifically sought out a promotion she 
knew required her to relocate was passed over on the assumption that 
she would not want to move her family.145 In each of these cases, the 
court found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the employment decision 
was infected by gender stereotypes was sufficient to create an inference of 
discrimination regardless of comparator evidence.146 
141 See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1327–30, 1327 n.205; Goldberg, supra note 
130, at 799, 799 n.236; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1349–52; see also 
Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109, at 639. Of course, misapplication of the 
comparator requirement occurs in sex discrimination cases as well; for a discussion of 
courts misapplying it to men alleging sex stereotyping claims, see Bornstein, supra 
note 93, at 1338–43. 
142 Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ.02–3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at 
*1, *6 n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004).
143 See Stern v. Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 841, 853, 862–65 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
144 See Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1999). 
145 See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004). 
146 For additional cases so holding, see also Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1327 
n.205 (citing Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving an
employer who reacted angrily to the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of 
Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 474 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving an employer who commented 
derogatorily about the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. 
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2000) (involving an employer who 
implied that the plaintiff could not manage both a job and a family); Troy v. Bay State 
Comput. Grp., Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving an employer who 
suggested that the plaintiff was unable to perform her job due to her pregnancy); 
Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving an employer 
who questioned an applicant about her plans to get pregnant based on a desire not to 
hire a woman who would get pregnant and quit); Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 
6, 682 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving an employer who implied that the 
plaintiff was less available and dedicated to the job because she had a family)). 
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A landmark decision by the Second Circuit, in the 2004 case Back v. 
Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, provides an example of a sex 
stereotyping plaintiff succeeding without a comparator in a field impact-
ed by occupational segregation.147 The plaintiff was a well-performing 
school psychologist who, after she had a child, experienced declining 
performance evaluations, resulting in her unexpectedly being denied 
tenure.148 The court rejected the defendant school’s argument that she 
should lose on summary judgment unless she could produce evidence of 
“similarly situated men” that the school had treated better than her.149 
Requiring a male comparator may have posed a particular challenge as 
the plaintiff was the only school psychologist and 85% of the school’s 
teachers were women, 71% of whom were mothers.150 The court held 
that, while comparative evidence may have been helpful, it was not re-
quired: “what matters is how [plaintiff] Back was treated.” 151 According to 
the court, “stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of mother-
hood and employment” made by the female decision makers who denied 
her tenure was evidence enough that “‘gender played a part’ in [the] 
employment decision.”152 Thus, the court held, “stereotyping of women 
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermis-
sible, sex-based motive.”153 
In an important statement about the role of comparative evidence in 
proving discrimination, the EEOC highlighted this development in En-
forcement Guidance it issued on the topic of caregiver discrimination in 
2007.154 Citing Back and other sex stereotyping cases related to family re-
sponsibilities, the Guidance explained that, when proving intentional sex 
discrimination using circumstantial evidence, “while comparative evi-
dence is often useful”—in this context, “evidence showing more favora-
ble treatment of male caregivers than female caregivers”—it is only one 
type of evidence from which an inference of discrimination may be 
drawn and is “not necessary to establish a violation.”155 In summarizing 
case law on caregiver discrimination and articulating its own internal po-
sition on proof required, the EEOC stated clearly that evidence of unlaw-
147 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
148 Id. at 114–16. 
149 Id. at 117–22. 
150 Id. at 122. While disregarding the necessity of comparative evidence, the court 





154 See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1352; Enforcement Guidance, supra 
note 29. 
155 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 29. 
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ful stereotyping “may support an inference of discrimination even absent 
comparative evidence about the treatment of men with children.”156 
Two years later, in its 2009 decision in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., the 
First Circuit showed how far this advance could go, upholding a plain-
tiff’s case at summary judgment despite the defendant employer’s evi-
dence of arguably an anti-comparator: the person who received the pro-
motion for which the plaintiff, a mother alleging sex discrimination, was 
passed over was also a mother.157 The court held that the plaintiff, an out-
standing employee with four children—6-year old triplets and an 11-year 
old—could create an inference of discrimination based on her superior 
qualifications and statements by decision makers evincing concern about 
her competing work and family responsibilities.158 The court was not per-
suaded by the fact that the person promoted over the plaintiff was the 
mother of a 9- and a 14-year old, noting that “the stereotype that [the 
plaintiff] complains of would arguably be more strongly held as to a 
mother of four children, three of whom were only six-years old, than as 
to a mother of two older children.”159 Moreover, the court noted, not dis-
criminating against one member of a protected class does not excuse dis-
crimination against another given that Title VII requires a focus on the 
treatment of employees as individuals.160 
Most compellingly, the Supreme Court itself weighed in again about 
the nature of comparative evidence in a recent caregiver discrimination 
case—its 2015 decision in Young v. UPS.161 In Young, the Court considered 
the scope of accommodations required by Title VII’s mandate, as 
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).162 The PDA is the 
one piece of Title VII that does, in fact, require a comparison, yet not a 
comparator. To establish a violation, a pregnant employee must show that 
the employer failed to treat her “the same . . . as” other nonpregnant 
employees who were similar in their “ability or inability to work.”163 While 
the plaintiff in Young did not expressly plead her case using a sex stereo-
typing theory, she alleged that stereotypes about pregnant women’s abili-
ties to work and need for accommodations played a role in the defendant 
employer’s decision to exclude pregnant women from a policy allowing 
other workers access to light duty positions.164 
156 Id. 
157 Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009). 
158 See id. at 46. 
159 Id. at 42 n.4. 
160 See id. 
161 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343–44 (2015). 
162 Id. at 1345. 
163 Id. 
164 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. at 24 (D. Md. 2010) (No. DKC 
08 CV 2586), 2010 WL 10839226. 
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In Young, when articulating what a plaintiff alleging pregnancy dis-
crimination must show, the Court once again revisited the framework of 
proof for intentional discrimination: 
[Under] the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . an individual 
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by “showing actions taken 
by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain 
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were 
based on a discriminatory criterion” . . . . The burden of making 
this showing is “not onerous” . . . . Neither does it require the plaintiff to 
show that those whom the employer favored and those whom the employer dis-
favored were similar in all but the protected ways.165 
Tellingly, even in the context of a claim under Title VII that requires 
comparisons—that is, that seeks an answer to the question of whether 
pregnant employees were treated “the same . . . as” other employees—the 
Court made clear that there was no comparator “requirement” and that, 
if a comparator was offered, he or she need not be similar to the plaintiff 
“in all . . . ways.”166 
The Court’s statement in Young is the clearest statement yet that fed-
eral courts should no longer consider the lack of comparator evidence 
fatal to a discrimination case. Yet it, too, risks being overlooked because it 
was made in the context of a caregiver discrimination case. Indeed, the 
Court articulated that a portion of the Young decision was limited to the 
context of pregnancy discrimination: after making its generally applica-
ble statement about McDonnell Douglas proof, the Court went on to spell 
out the prongs of a prima facie case of denial of pregnancy accommoda-
tions, noting that the prongs as they described them are “limited to the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act context.”167 In this context, the Court de-
scribed the fourth prong of the prima facie case, whereby the plaintiff 
must create an inference of discrimination, as requiring evidence that 
the defendant accommodated any others “similar in their ability or ina-
bility to work.”168 Notably, the Court said nothing at all about the workers 
being “similarly situated” in general; the comparison is limited solely to 
pregnant and nonpregnant employees’ physical work capabilities. More-
over, while the Court stated that this prong, as defined, is limited to cases 
of pregnancy—as opposed to all claims of—discrimination, the Court al-
so described it as “consistent with our longstanding rule that a plaintiff 
can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s” case in a discrimina-
tion lawsuit under Title VII.169 Thus, the Court’s general discussion in 
165 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
166 See id. at 1345, 1353–34. 
167 Id. at 1355. 
168 Id. at 1354. 
169 Id. at 1355. 
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Young of McDonnell Douglas proof—which made no mention of a compar-
ator requirement—applies regardless of protected class.170 
3. Transgender Discrimination Per Se
While sex stereotyping cases alleging caregiver discrimination helped 
establish that comparator evidence is no longer required to infer discrim-
ination, sex stereotyping cases alleging transgender status discrimination 
provide examples of this legal advance applied. 
The area of transgender status discrimination has evolved rapidly in 
the last decade. Early cases brought by gender “non-conformers” alleging 
discrimination were rejected as beyond the reach of Title VII’s prohibi-
tions against sex discrimination. Cases alleging discrimination on the ba-
sis of gender identity were lumped in with those alleging sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, and both were held to be outside of Title VII’s 
protected class of “sex.”171 This rationale changed after the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of stereotyping in the 1989 Price Waterhouse case, in 
which the Court held that evidence that the plaintiff’s failure to conform 
to a feminine gender stereotype played a role in her being denied a 
promotion could create an inference of sex discrimination.172 Between 
1997 and 2002, based on Price Waterhouse and another Supreme Court 
decision—Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,173 holding that a het-
erosexual man who was sexually harassed by other men could sue under 
Title VII—a handful of circuit court cases laid the groundwork for 
170 See id. at 1353–54. Still, despite the limited comparison the Court described in 
the pregnancy accommodation context, even the EEOC’s own Enforcement 
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination, revised in the wake of the Young decision, 
muddles the issue. Before explaining the Court’s description of a prima facie case for 
pregnancy accommodation, the EEOC notes that, to make out a prima facie case 
using circumstantial evidence, “a plaintiff must produce evidence that a similarly 
situated worker was treated differently or more favorably than the pregnant worker.” 
Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, U.S. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n (June 25, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/ 
pregnancy_guidance.cfm#IC (emphasis added). This mistakes the Court’s definition 
in Young of the fourth prong of the prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination, 
which requires that the comparative evidence relate only to whether another 
employee was similar in their physical work capabilities—and requires nothing at all 
about the workers being generally “similarly situated.” Unfortunately, this shows just 
how long of a shadow has been cast by the comparator requirement developed in the 
context of first generation discrimination case law, despite the Court’s repeated 
statements that no such evidence is required. 
171 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 
F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1979); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 
1977); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
abrogation of these cases by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
172 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250–55; supra Part I.B.3. 
173 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
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transgender discrimination claims.174 These early cases permitted men 
harassed for being “too effeminate” to allege sexual harassment under 
Title VII, even when the source of the harassment was their homosexuali-
ty, and despite many courts’ views that sexual orientation discrimination 
was excluded from the protected class of “sex.”175 
Then, in a germinal 2004 decision, Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth 
Circuit held that a fire lieutenant who was suspended because of her stat-
ed gender identity as “transsexual” could rely on a Price Waterhouse stereo-
typing theory to state a claim under Title VII’s prohibition for sex dis-
crimination.176 To do so, the circuit court rejected the district court’s 
characterization that the plaintiff’s reliance on sex stereotyping was 
merely “an end run around [the] ‘real’ claim” of status discrimination 
“based upon . . . transsexuality,” overturning its holding that “Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s transsexual-
ism.”177 This, the circuit court held, was an incorrect interpretation of the 
law relying on outdated pre-Price Waterhouse decisions, an error of law be-
cause that rationale had been “eviscerated” by the Supreme Court in Price 
Waterhouse:178 
By holding that Title VII protected a woman who failed to conform 
to social expectations concerning how a woman should look and 
behave, the Supreme Court established that Title VII’s reference to 
“sex” encompasses both the biological differences between men 
and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination 
based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.179 
Applying this interpretation, the Sixth Circuit held that Smith, who al-
leged it was her failure to conform to stereotypes about how a person 
born biologically male should look and act that “was the driving force 
behind” the employer’s adverse actions, had stated a cognizable claim of 
sex discrimination under Title VII.180 Since the Smith decision, courts of 
appeals in the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and federal dis-
trict courts in at least 10 states and the District of Columbia have held 
similarly that discrimination on the basis of a gender identity constitutes 
174 See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Nichols v. 
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 
1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), rev’d on 
other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
175 See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1064–65; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869, 874–75; Schwenk, 204 
F.3d at 1192–93; Doe, 119 F.3d at 566, 580–81.  
176 Smith, 378 F.3d at 573. 
177 Id. at 571. 
178 Id. at 573–74. 
179 Id. at 573. 
180 Id. at 572. 
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sex discrimination under Title VII.181 In 2012, the EEOC also formally 
stated its adoption of this position.182 
As the sex stereotyping theory of transgender discrimination is cur-
rently recognized, discriminating against an employee because of her 
gender identity or transgender status is sex discrimination per se, regard-
less of any comparator or comparative evidence.183 Because the adverse 
employment action in these cases is motivated by the mere fact of the 
plaintiff’s failure to conform to expected gender stereotypes, the plaintiff 
may create an inference of sex discrimination based on stereotyping evi-
dence alone. Thus, transgender discrimination cases provide a body of 
 
181  See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–20 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 
holdings in the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits, and in district courts in D.C., N.Y, Pa., and 
Tex.); Examples of Court Decisions Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimination 
Under Title VII, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/newsroom/wysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm (citing holdings in the 1st, 6th, 
9th, and 11th Circuits and in district courts in Mich., N.C., Ala., Md., Minn., Tex., Pa., 
N.Y., and Ind.). 
182 See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, *7–8 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Oppor-
tunity Comm’n Apr. 20, 2012); What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement 
Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers
.cfm. Note that, in 2015, the EEOC formally stated its position that discrimination be-
cause of an employee’s sexual orientation is also impermissible sex discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. See id; Baldwin v. Dep't of Transportation, Appeal No. 
0120133080, *6 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n July 15, 2015) (“[W]e con-
clude that sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allega-
tion of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex 
discrimination under Title VII”). To date, a few federal courts have been receptive to 
this position, see Baldwin, supra, at *7, 10 (citing cases in U.S. district courts in Colo., 
Conn., D.C., Mass., Or., and W. Wash.). Yet many more have expressly rejected this 
position as “bootstrapping” the separate category of “sexual orientation” onto the 
protected category of “sex,” even after Price Waterhouse and Smith. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Comm. Coll., 2016 WL 4039703, *2–4 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016) (reaffirming the 
7th Circuit’s “unequivocal . . . holding that Title VII does not redress sexual orienta-
tion discrimination,” even after the EEOC’s Baldwin decision, and citing to similar 
holdings in the D.C., 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits). For this reason, 
separate discussion of cases alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
(as opposed to transgender status/gender identity) under a sex stereotyping theory is 
beyond the scope of this Article. To the extent that sexual orientation discrimination 
cases may succeed based on a similar sex stereotyping rationale, however, the lessons 
for employment discrimination law would be the same. For a discussion of applying 
Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory to cover claims of sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, see the sources listed in note 114, supra.  
183  See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 (citing Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: 
Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007); Taylor Flinn, 
Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex 
and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 392 (2001)). But see Etsitty v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (refusing to hold that 
“transsexuals” as a class are protected under “sex”). 
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precedent in which federal courts have routinely allowed plaintiffs’ cases 
to survive past the pleading stage despite providing little or no compara-
tive evidence. 
Several cases provide examples. While the Sixth Circuit in Smith de-
scribed the plaintiff’s prima facie case in the traditional way, listing the 
fourth prong of the prima facie case as a showing that the plaintiff “was 
treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his pro-
tected class,” the court nevertheless held that the plaintiff had satisfied 
this prong with proof that “he would not have been treated differently, 
on account of his non-masculine behavior . . . had he been a woman in-
stead of a man.”184 In another Sixth Circuit case, Barnes v. City of Cincin-
nati, the court responded to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff, 
alleging sex discrimination in promotion, had failed to produce required 
evidence that “other employees of similar qualifications who were not 
members of the protected class received promotions” with a broad view 
of the necessary evidence.185 The plaintiff “need not demonstrate an ex-
act correlation with [an] employee receiving more favorable treatment,” 
the court held; it was enough that the plaintiff was the only employee in a 
seven-year period to not make it through the probationary period, in-
cluding one employee who performed worse.186 
After discussing both Smith and Barnes, a federal district court in 
Michigan held, with no discussion of comparative evidence, that when a 
plaintiff who announced a gender transition was told that what the plain-
tiff “was ‘proposing to do’ was unacceptable” and then fired, the allega-
tion that “failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force be-
hind” the employer’s firing alone was enough to survive a motion to 
dismiss.187 Likewise, after identifying that the prima facie case required a 
plaintiff to show that “her employer treated similarly situated employees 
outside her class more favorably” or that, when she was fired, “she was 
replaced by someone outside her protected class,” a Georgia federal dis-
trict court found that the employer’s statements that “he was very nervous 
about [the plaintiff’s] situation,” “did not want her to wear a dress to 
work,” and was concerned about the impact on coworkers and the busi-
ness were “adequate to permit an inference of discrimination,” with no 
mention of a comparator.188 
Transgender discrimination cases provide examples of the applica-
tion of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as it was made 
 
184 Smith, 378 F.3d at 570. 
185 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2005). 
186 Id. 
187 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. 
100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 603 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
188 Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1197–98 (N.D. Ga. 
2014) (citation omitted). 
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clear in the caregiver discrimination context: a plaintiff with stereotyping 
evidence need not provide comparator evidence to create an inference 
of impermissible discrimination. 
B. A Bridge from Stray Remarks to Stereotyping Evidence 
The second development from recent sex stereotyping cases that can 
help modernize antidiscrimination doctrine as a whole is on what consti-
tutes “direct evidence” of intentional discrimination and, alternatively, 
what evidence can be disregarded as mere “stray remarks.” First genera-
tion case law established that a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimina-
tion through either direct evidence, which establishes a discriminatory 
motive without the need for inferences, or circumstantial evidence, 
which requires the plaintiff to follow the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
create an inference of discrimination.189 By the 1990s, despite the strong 
persistence of cultural stereotypes about sex, race, and other protected 
classes, direct statements by an employer that a protected class motivated 
its adverse employment decision were virtually nonexistent. Courts began 
to distinguish statements evincing stereotypical beliefs from those that 
served as direct evidence of discrimination, referring to the former as 
“stray remarks.”190 Since then, the so-called “stray remarks doctrine” has 
gained strength and influence, allowing courts to discount the eviden-
tiary value of such statements. Yet given the more subtle and structural 
nature of bias today, any evidence that exposes hidden bias should not be 
discounted at the pleading stage. Innovative cases alleging sex stereotyp-
ing have helped break down these categories, broadening what may be 
useful stereotyping evidence and revisiting what constitutes “direct evi-
dence” of discrimination. 
1. Direct Evidence and the “Stray Remarks” Doctrine 
In the series of cases establishing how to prove intentional discrimi-
nation under Title VII, the Supreme Court created two different routes 
of proof based on the type of evidence a plaintiff was able to proffer, di-
rect or circumstantial.191 These two routes continue to shape Title VII lit-
igation today. If, as in the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff employee 
has no “smoking gun” but only circumstantial evidence of discrimination 
by the defendant employer, the plaintiff proceeds under the three-part 
burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework described previously.192 If, 
however, the plaintiff can provide direct evidence of discrimination, the 
 
189 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); Brown v. E. 
Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); Earley v. Champion Int’l 
Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081–82 (11th Cir. 1990). 
190 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277. 
191 See supra Part II.A.1. 
192 See id. 
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burden of persuasion shifts immediately to the defendant to prove that 
discriminatory animus was not the motivation for the adverse employ-
ment action being challenged because it would have taken the same ac-
tion regardless of the plaintiff’s protected class.193 The Court defines “di-
rect evidence” as that which proves discrimination standing by itself, 
without a factfinder needing to draw an inference or make a presump-
tion that discrimination motivated the decision.194 So defined, direct evi-
dence requires essentially an admission by the employer that the plain-
tiff’s protected class motivated its decision—for example, that the 
employer did not want to hire a woman or promote an African Ameri-
can.195 Thus the usefulness of the direct evidence route of proving inten-
tional discrimination became virtually nonexistent almost as soon as the 
Court articulated it: no thinking employer aware that Title VII exists 
would make such an admission. 
The direct evidence method of proof was revived, however, by the 
emergence of the stereotype theory in the Supreme Court’s 1989 deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse.196 As described previously, in Price Waterhouse, the 
Court held that evidence that an employer relied on impermissible sex 
stereotypes in making an adverse employment decision against the plain-
tiff could constitute evidence of discrimination “‘because of’ sex.”197 In a 
separate concurrence, Justice O’Connor expressed her opinion that 
plaintiff Ann Hopkins had provided direct evidence of sex discrimina-
tion.198 Hopkins had showed that the decision makers who denied her a 
promotion did so at least in part based on their belief that she was too 
“macho” and should walk, talk, and dress “more femininely.”199 As Justice 
O’Connor saw it, 
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room 
where partnership decisions were being made . . . [and] heard sev-
eral of [the decisionmakers] make sexist remarks in discussing her 
suitability for partnership. [And a]s the decisionmakers exited the 
room, she was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking pro-
 
193 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56; see also, e.g., Brown, 989 F.2d at 861. 
194 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56; see also, e.g., Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081–82. 
195 See, e.g., Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081–82 (holding that “[o]nly the most blatant 
remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate” suffice as direct 
evidence) (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (1989)).  
196 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56. 
197 Id. at 241; see also supra Part I.B.3. 
198 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also McGinley, supra note 78, at 472 (describing how, under Price 
Waterhouse, “overt stereotyping by a decision maker [is] virtually the equivalent of 
direct evidence of discrimination”). 
199 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
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cess that her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her 
partnership bid.200 
While essential to Justice O’Connor’s agreement with the Court’s hold-
ing in favor of Hopkins (due to the mixed-motives nature of the case), 
this finding was not part of the plurality’s opinion, which held that Hop-
kins could prevail even with circumstantial evidence.201 Still, Justice 
O’Connor helped lay the groundwork to establish that stereotyping evi-
dence could, in certain circumstances, serve as direct evidence of dis-
crimination. 
Yet in the very same concurrence, Justice O’Connor also noted that, 
to constitute direct evidence and justify shifting the burden of persuasion 
of nondiscrimination to the employer, such stereotyping had to be close-
ly tied to the adverse employment decision and not be “stray remarks.”202 
Neither, she stated, could “statements by nondecisionmakers, or state-
ments by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process” constitute 
enough direct evidence to shift the burden similarly—for example, a 
“perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory . . . mere reference to ‘a lady 
candidate,’” she wrote, would not be enough.203 
With this statement, Justice O’Connor sparked what has come to be 
known as the “stray remarks doctrine,” whereby evidence that reveals im-
permissibly stereotypical beliefs may nonetheless be discounted for evi-
dentiary purposes.204 As it has been interpreted by many federal courts, 
the stray remarks doctrine holds that express statements about the plain-
tiff’s protected class do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination 
when made outside the context of the relevant adverse employment deci-
sion (usually temporally) or by someone other than the relevant decision 
maker, or even if the remarks are considered to be too few or “isolat-
ed.”205 Yet as scholars and even some jurists have noted, the doctrine has 
gone far beyond the initial suggestion that stray remarks are not direct ev-
idence.206 Where such indirect evidence may not shift the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant, it should still serve as probative circumstantial 
 
200 Id. at 272–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted). 
201 See id. at 241–42 (majority opinion). 
202 Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  
203 Id. 
204 See Kerri Lynn Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine after Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 219 (2002); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of 
the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 149 (2012). 
205 See Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 242–43; see also, e.g., 
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998); Jones v. 
Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998); Bevill v. 
UAB Walker Coll., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1999). 
206 See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 150. 
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evidence from which the factfinder may infer discrimination to shift the 
burden of production in the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
To be sure, application of the stray remarks doctrine has not been 
consistent, and a number of courts have signaled its lessening value.207 A 
decade after Price Waterhouse, in 2000, the Supreme Court weighed in on 
the issue in the age discrimination case Reeves v. Sanderson.208 While the 
Court criticized the appellate court’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s evi-
dence because it discounted the value of statements evincing age-related 
stereotypes, it did not clearly reject the stray remarks doctrine outright.209 
After Reeves, some federal courts revisited and distanced themselves from 
the doctrine;210 nevertheless, in most courts, the concept of stray remarks 
persists to devalue potentially valuable evidence today.211 
As a result, in some cases involving evidence of impermissible stereo-
typing, particularly sex stereotyping cases of women perceived to be “too 
masculine” like Ann Hopkins, indirect stereotyping evidence has still 
helped create a circumstantial inference of discrimination.212 Yet in too 
many others, particularly those involving racial stereotypes, the stray re-
marks doctrine continues to be misapplied to discount evidence that may 
expose hidden bias—often a key factor in litigating second generation 
discrimination.213 
2. Caregiver Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence 
In the context of recent cases alleging caregiver discrimination, 
plaintiffs have been more successful in converting what might otherwise 
be considered “stray remarks” into valuable circumstantial evidence from 
which to infer discrimination. By including a stereotype theory argument 
in their intentional disparate treatment claims, caregivers have broad-
ened the lens of what is probative of discrimination, creating a wider net 
of relevant stereotyping evidence. Also, because at the core of unlawful 
sex stereotypes about caregivers is the idea that being a mother (or ac-
tive, thus “effeminate” father) is incompatible with being a good work-
er,214 even statements made outside of the temporal proximity of an ad-
 
207 See id. at 190; Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 246–47. 
208 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
209 See Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 251; Stone, Taking in 
Strays, supra note 204, at 171. 
210 See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 172–73. 
211 See id.; Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 252. 
212 See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 175–77. 
213 See id. at 182–83; see also Catherine Albiston, Kathryn Burkett Dickson, 
Charlotte Fishman & Leslie F. Levy, Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 Hastings L.J. 1285, 1293–95 
(2008) (discussing how so called “stray remarks” actually “may provide a ‘glimpse’ or 
a ‘window’ into the true, but partially repressed, attitudes” of the employer).  
214 Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and 
What to Do About It 65–70 (2000) (describing the “ideal worker” norm). 
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verse employment decision still relate to a plaintiff’s suitability for the job, 
which allows courts to view them as not “stray.” 
Several cases in which plaintiffs allege sex discrimination based on 
their family caregiving responsibilities provide examples. In its holding, 
in Back v. Hastings on Hudson School District, that a caregiver alleging sex 
discrimination under a sex stereotyping theory need not provide com-
parator evidence, the Second Circuit also addressed the notion of stray 
remarks.215 When overturning the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment against the plaintiff, the court of appeals relied on evidence of 
alleged statements made by supervisors over the course of a year asking 
the plaintiff, a new mother, to space out her childbearing, suggesting 
“that this was perhaps not the job . . . for her if she had ‘little ones,’” and 
questioning her continued commitment to work.216 All of this was rele-
vant stereotyping evidence about the plaintiff’s “inability to combine 
work and motherhood” that could create an inference of discrimina-
tion—evidence that “[t]he district court [had] inaccurately characterized 
as ‘stray remarks.’”217 
In another case, the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court’s judg-
ment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant employer in a sex dis-
crimination case brought by an employee who was terminated while 
pregnant.218 In doing so, the court rejected the district court’s assessment 
that a supervisor’s purported statement that “she had a business to run 
and could not handle having a pregnant woman in the office” was “noth-
ing more than stray remarks” because the supervisor was not the ultimate 
decision maker.219 Likewise, in a sex discrimination case brought by a 
mother who was fired the day before her probationary period of em-
ployment was to end, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s charac-
terization of key sex stereotyping evidence as “stray.”220 Instead, the court 
of appeals held, evidence that her supervisors questioned her “ability to 
balance . . . work and parental responsibilities” should she have another 
child, and comments made in the context of hiring other employees that 
the company “preferred unmarried, childless women because they would 
give 150% to the job” were valid circumstantial evidence and not, as the 
district court had held, “‘stray remarks,’ insufficient to enable a jury to 
conclude . . . pretext.”221 Indeed, the plaintiff could even “point[] to 
 
215 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
216 Id. at 115. 
217 Id. at 119, 124 n.12. 
218 See Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 612 (5th 
Cir. 2007). 
219 Id. at 607. 
220 Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 
2000). 
221 Id. at 51, 55. 
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comments made by others . . . that illustrate a discriminatory attitude in 
the company as a whole” such as comments regarding “the company’s 
treatment of female employees with children.”222 While none of these 
statements proved discrimination alone, the court of appeals held, a fact-
finder “could reasonably rely upon” all of this stereotyping evidence to 
infer discrimination.223 
Even a statement open to multiple interpretations may be found not 
stray when it could be an expression of “benevolent” stereotyping—
seemingly well-meaning stereotyping that nevertheless redounds to the 
detriment of the employee being stereotyped.224 In Chadwick v. Wellpoint, 
when holding that the plaintiff had enough evidence to survive summary 
judgment despite the fact that another mother received the promotion 
she was denied, the First Circuit highlighted a general statement made 
several months prior to the promotion decision (albeit by a decision 
maker): “Oh my—I did not know you had triplets. Bless you!”225 The 
court could have disregarded this statement as stray.226 Instead, it found 
the statement relevant to the strength of the sex stereotypes against the 
plaintiff, essential to the plaintiff’s ability to create an inference of dis-
crimination despite comparative evidence that favored the employer 
(that the promotion went to another mother).227 
By including a stereotyping frame that ties stereotypes related to the 
protected class “because of sex” to a general suitability for work, caregiver 
discrimination cases have helped expand the narrow lens of the “stray 
remarks” doctrine. Caregiver discrimination cases show that courts can 
and should stop discounting the value of evidence of stereotypical think-
ing more broadly in the workplace. Instead, these cases show, such proof 
is useful stereotyping evidence that helps shine a light on hidden second 
generation discrimination. 
3. Transgender Discrimination and Direct Evidence of Stereotyping 
In the context of cases alleging transgender discrimination, courts 
have not only rejected the characterization of stereotyping evidence as 
“stray remarks,” but—to the contrary—have held that such evidence may 
provide direct evidence of intentional discrimination against transgender 
 
222 Id. at 55–56. 
223 Id. at 56. 
224 See, e.g., Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: 
Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 491 
(1996).  
225 Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2009). 
226 See id. at 47 n.10. The district court had gone even further, finding the 
statement to be “a friendly exclamation”; the appellate court disagreed, believing it 
“suggest[ed] pity rather than respect.” Id. 
227 See id. at 42–43 n.4 (noting that “the stereotype that [the plaintiff] complains 
of would arguably be more strongly held as to a mother of four children, three of 
whom were only six years old, than as to a mother of two older children”). 
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employees. As described previously, a plaintiff who can provide direct ev-
idence need not prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework; the direct evidence alone establishes a discriminatory motive, 
shifting the burden immediately to the defendant to justify its behavior.228 
Not only does direct evidence remove a significant procedural hurdle for 
the plaintiff, but the characterization of the plaintiff’s proof as direct evi-
dence makes it less likely that the defendant will be able to persuade a 
factfinder that its motives were nondiscriminatory.229 
Cases in which plaintiffs allege sex discrimination based on their 
transgender status demonstrate courts’ rejection of the stray remarks 
doctrine in the transgender discrimination context. In Glenn v. Brumby, 
the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiff’s case in the usual 
way, by stating the rule that “[a] plaintiff can show discriminatory intent 
through direct or circumstantial evidence.”230 Yet instead of moving on to 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the prima facie 
case, the court explained that, where a transgender plaintiff was fired be-
cause of the employer’s belief that it was “inappropriate,” “unsettling,” 
and “unnatural” for the plaintiff, born biologically male, to present as a 
woman, the decision was based on “the sheer fact of the transition.”231 As 
such, the plaintiff had provided “ample direct evidence” of sex discrimina-
tion such that a Title VII analysis “would end [t]here.”232 
Similarly, a Texas federal district court described how evidence that 
a decision to rescind an employment offer from an applicant because she 
presented herself as female during the interview process but was later 
discovered to be born a biological male could constitute direct evidence 
of sex discrimination.233 The court explained that rescinding the job offer 
due to what the employer described as the plaintiff’s “misrepresentation” 
during the interview process could evince animus against the plaintiff for 
“inconsisten[cy] with . . . preconceived notions of what a male should 
look and act like.”234 This, the court explained, “qualifies as direct evi-
dence” because it “directly links the adverse employment action at issue 
with the alleged unlawfully discriminatory motive”—here, plaintiff’s fail-
 
228 See supra Part II.B.1. 
229 See id. 
230 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011).  
231 Id. at 1314, 1321. 
232 Id. at 1321 (emphasis added). Because this case was brought by a public 
employee alleging a constitutional violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, rather than under Title VII, the court continued on, holding similarly under 
equal protection. The cited portion of its analysis is applicable to Title VII cases. See 
id.; Lautermilch v. Findlay City Schs., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 2003). 
233 Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008). 
234 Id. at 662. 
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ure to conform to gender stereotypes.235 Despite the defendant’s explana-
tion that it was the dishonesty behind the “misrepresentation” and not 
the plaintiff’s transgender status that motivated its decision, the court 
held that the factual question regarding direct evidence was enough for 
plaintiff to survive defendant’s challenge on summary judgment.236 
Of course, to be considered direct evidence, bias based on a plain-
tiff’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes must still be linked to the 
adverse employment decision such that discriminatory motive is clear 
without the need for an inference. Thus, a Georgia federal district court 
held that an employer’s statements during a meeting that he “did not 
want [plaintiff] to wear a dress to work” and that he was “very nervous” 
about the plaintiff’s gender transition and its potential effects on the 
business did not amount to direct evidence of discrimination when the 
plaintiff was terminated two months later.237 While the court agreed that 
the statements “reflect[ed] a discriminatory attitude,” they were not 
made contemporaneously or in connection with the termination deci-
sion; the factfinder would still have to make “an inferential leap between 
fact and conclusion,” so the statements were not direct evidence.238 But 
tellingly, the statements were allowed to stand as circumstantial evidence 
from which one could infer sex discrimination—the statements were not 
discounted or excluded as stray remarks irrelevant to the employer’s mo-
tivations.239 
The formulation of transgender discrimination as sex discrimination 
per se provides a context that may be uniquely likely to generate direct 
stereotyping evidence of discrimination. Still, the fact that at least some 
federal courts have understood that reliance on stereotypes can consti-
tute direct evidence represents a step toward the recognition of modern 
forms of unlawful bias. Echoing Justice O’Connor’s perspective in her 
Price Waterhouse concurrence,240 courts in transgender discrimination cas-
es have now clearly held that evidence that an employer relied directly on 
stereotypes related to a protected class—not just the protected class itself—is 
enough to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. 
 
235 Id.  
236 Id. at 662–63. Note, however, that the court also denied plaintiff’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, due to open questions of material fact regarding the 
interpretation of defendant’s explanation. Id. 
237 Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1192–98 (N.D. Ga. 
2014). 
238 Id.  
239 Id. at 1197; supra Part II.B.1. 
240 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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C. Identifying Universal Patterns of Stereotyping at Work 
In addition to providing concrete doctrinal advantages on compara-
tors and stray remarks, sex stereotyping cases provide theoretical advanc-
es for Title VII litigation by providing a framework for spotting unlawful 
bias in its modern forms. The facts involved in cutting edge sex stereotyp-
ing cases combine elements of both first and second generation discrim-
ination, which makes actionable discrimination easier for courts to per-
ceive in this context. Under stereotype theory, decisions infected with 
impermissible stereotypes related to a protected class constitute decisions 
“because of” that protected class.241 Thus failing to promote an employee 
because she is perceived to be less committed to work as a mother, or be-
cause she is perceived not to fit in as a transgender woman becomes 
overt, first generation-style discrimination. Yet recognizing caregiver and 
transgender discrimination also required courts to see how stereotypes 
about suitability for work that stand in contrast to workplace norms and 
cultures are rooted in protected class status. 
A vast body of research has documented numerous patterns of stere-
otyping that operate to disadvantage women at work.242 At its core, how-
ever, the actionable legal harm that arises in cutting-edge sex stereotyp-
ing cases can be grouped roughly into one of two basic types of cases—
models that can be applied to stereotyping regardless of protected class. 
In one model, an individual employee is penalized based on the assump-
tion that she will conform to a negative stereotype of her group—known 
in social science as “descriptive” stereotyping. 243 For example, a mother is 
passed over for promotion because she is assumed to be less competent 
or less committed to work. Groups stereotyped as lower in competence 
often find themselves held to different or higher performance standards 
than others whose competence is assumed, forcing them to continually 
prove their competence. 244 In the second model, an individual employee 
is penalized based on the assumption that she should conform to a stereo-
type associated with her group and fails to do so—known as “prescriptive” 
 
241 See supra Part I.B.3. 
242 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 105, at 412–35 (citing and summarizing in detail 
the social science on patterns of gender stereotypes at work). 
243 See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes 
Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. Issues 657, 657–74 
(2001); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60 
J. Soc. Issues 683, 690–92 (2004); Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 110, at 763–64 
(referring to this as “ascriptive” stereotyping); Herz, supra note 115, at 398–403, 405–
07 (same). 
244 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Rachel Dempsey, What Works for Women at 
Work: Four Patterns Working Women Need to Know 23–58 (2014) (naming and 
describing this phenomenon as “Prove-It-Again” bias); Martha Foschi, Double 
Standards for Competence: Theory and Research, 26 Ann. Rev. Sociol. 21, 21–42 (2000). 
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stereotyping. 245 For example, a pregnant woman is fired because her em-
ployer believes she should focus on her family instead of work, or a 
transgender woman who was born biologically male is not hired for fail-
ing to dress and act masculine. Underlying both models is a perception 
that the employee lacks “fit” with either the job or the workplace culture, 
in ways that implicate protected class status. 246 Caregiver and transgender 
discrimination cases provide doctrinal paths for redressing these pat-
terns, in which the perception and assessment of the employee’s compe-
tence and suitability for work is negatively affected by protected class ste-
reotypes.  
As described in Part III below, although the specific stereotypes asso-
ciated with different protected classes may vary, the way in which such 
stereotypes affect the workplace and lead to adverse employment actions 
follow similar patterns; as such, all should be similarly actionable. 
III. THE PROMISE OF UNIFICATION 
For Title VII doctrine as a whole to benefit from advances in sex ste-
reotyping cases, and in the interest of doctrinal coherence, courts should 
recognize unlawful stereotyping similarly across all protected classes. This 
means that, where any plaintiff alleges disparate treatment because of a 
protected class, courts recognize the value of evidence evincing stereotyp-
ical beliefs and attitudes. Regardless of whether based on sex or race, the 
social science of stereotyping is the same, and stereotypes may manifest 
similarly in work structure and cultures. All discrimination case law may 
benefit from the modern approach to proof some courts have taken in 
sex stereotyping cases—an approach that more accurately reflect the op-
eration of bias in the workplace today. 
A. Extending Stereotype Theory Beyond Sex 
When, in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court first recognized the 
role that stereotyping could play in an adverse employment action under 
Title VII, the Court did not expressly limit its rationale to discrimination 
based on the protected classification of sex. While the focus of the deci-
sion was on sex stereotyping, the Court’s analysis included a discussion of 
the concept within the broader frame of Title VII as a whole.247 Thus 
 
245 See, e.g., Heilman, Description and Prescription, supra note 243, at 657–74; 
Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 243, at 690–92; Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 
110, at 763–64; Herz, supra note 115, at 398–403, 405–407. 
246  See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 
Res. Org. Behav. 270 (1983); Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case 
of Elite Professional Service Firms, 77 Am. Sociol. Rev. 999 (2012); Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259, 1267–70 (2000). 
247 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 239, 253 (1989). 
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plaintiffs may allege discrimination based on any protected class using a 
stereotype theory.248 
Yet to date, stereotype theory has been used most robustly to allege 
sex discrimination under Title VII. Far fewer cases alleging race or na-
tional origin discrimination articulate their case using a Price Waterhouse-
style stereotyping frame.249 And those that do are more likely to be un-
successful,250 often because evidence of racial or ethnic stereotyping is 
more likely to be discounted as mere “stray remarks.”251 This lack of prec-
edent, in turn, makes it less likely that other plaintiffs alleging race or na-
tional origin discrimination will include stereotype theory in their dispar-
ate treatment claims. 
For doctrinal advances in sex stereotyping to be applied in a way that 
unifies and modernizes antidiscrimination law, it is useful to uncover and 
overcome the source of this disparity. The difference in how courts view 
stereotyping on the basis of sex as opposed to race or national origin like-
ly stems, at least in part, from the constitutional law of Equal Protec-
tion.252 To prove race discrimination in violation of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of Equal Protection under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires proving that a state action had a discriminatory purpose; 
 
248 See id. at 253–54. Separate from Title VII, courts have also recognized age-
related stereotyping under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See supra note 
82. 
249 In a recent Westlaw search of all federal cases citing Price Waterhouse, 667 cases 
included references to stereotypes or stereotyping. When narrowed to identify cases 
discussing Title VII and race or gender stereotypes, only 58 cases referenced race or 
racial stereotypes, while 413 referenced sex or gender stereotypes (search conducted 
June 1, 2016). 
250 Recent data on caregiver discrimination cases (also known as “family 
responsibilities discrimination” or “FRD” cases) show a particularly high success rate 
for plaintiffs. In a dataset of over 4400 of such cases, plaintiffs had an overall success 
rate of 52% in all FRD cases filed (60% in cases filed by mothers) and of 67% in all 
FRD cases that went to trial (75% in trials in federal court), as compared to a plaintiff 
success rate of 28–36% in all types of employment discrimination cases that went to 
trial in federal court. Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Caregivers in the Workplace: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination Litigation Update 2016 4, 18, 21 & nn.47–48, 24 &  nn.58–
59 (Center for Worklife Law, UC Hastings College of the Law 2016), http:// 
www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDupdate2016.pdf. See also generally Wendy Parker, 
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006) 
251 See supra Part  II.B.1.; infra Part III.B. But see generally Yuracko, The 
Antidiscrimination Paradox, supra note 117 (challenging the contention that, in the 
context of appearance/performance of race or gender at work, Title VII doctrine has 
diverged to provide a more “expansive” reading of sex than race discrimination). 
252 But see Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox, supra note 117, at 46–47 
(suggesting that, to the extent gender identity receives greater protection than racial 
identity at work, it is due more to “culture, history, and, perhaps, biology” than to law: 
“Sex [and gender are] treated as rich and complex in ways that race is 
not . . . . Race . . . is viewed as a mere technical difference of skin tone unassociated 
with meaningful differences in behavior or self-presentation.”). 
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unlike under Title VII, a disparate impact theory of liability is not availa-
ble.253 Legal scholars have suggested that this animus-oriented approach 
and a commitment to colorblindness under the Constitution has limited 
Equal Protection’s ability to reach the full scope of race discrimination.254 
Stephen Rich has noted that the “discriminatory purpose doctrine” of 
Equal Protection, which “requires evidence of malice, or animus,” is “ill-
suited to address ‘second generation discrimination’ that frequently re-
sults from unconscious stereotyping.”255 Likewise, Jerry Kang has suggest-
ed that a focus on “intent to harm minorities” and “facial racial classifica-
tions” has hindered Equal Protection doctrine’s ability to redress the 
important harms of implicit racial bias and stereotyping.256 
In contrast, sex discrimination cases under Equal Protection law 
have long recognized that acting on the basis of sex stereotypes consti-
tutes intentional discrimination. Indeed, the recognition of sex stereotyp-
ing under Title VII in Price Waterhouse grew out of earlier Equal Protec-
tion cases holding that it was impermissible sex discrimination for state 
and federal governments to enact laws that relied on gender stereo-
types.257 While early constitutional sex discrimination cases addressed ex-
plicit (rather than implicit) sex stereotypes, the idea that relying on sex 
stereotypes could constitute a constitutional discriminatory purpose set 
the stage for the expansion of sex stereotyping law under Title VII; the 
same was not the case for racial stereotyping. 
To the extent that Equal Protection doctrine spillover has hampered 
courts’ ability and willingness to recognize actionable racial stereotyping 
in the context of Title VII, this is unnecessary. Equal Protection and Title 
 
253 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–48 (1976). 
254 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 317–388; Ian Haney-López, Intentional 
Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1781–89, 1853 (2012); Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent 
and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism about Equal Protection, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 627, 646–48 
(2015); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 464, 464–90 (2010); Rich, supra note 26, at 203, 230–32. Anita 
Bernstein has also suggested that the constitutional law of stereotyping has not gone 
as far as the Thirteenth Amendment allows: its prohibition on the “badges and 
incidents” of slavery could plausibly support legislation to prohibit racial stereotyping. 
Bernstein, supra note 92, at 705–711 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 441 (1968)).  
255 Rich, supra note 26, at 231. 
256 Kang, supra note 254, at 646–48. For a discussion of how sexual orientation 
has been treated under Equal Protection doctrine, see generally Russell K. Robinson, 
Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) (identifying what Russell describes as 
“LGBT exceptionalism” in constitutional law, whereby Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has provided advantages in cases involving the rights of gays and lesbians unavailable 
to other protected classifications, like race and sex). 
257 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 
(citing City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 
(1978)). 
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VII doctrine are different, and courts in Title VII cases need not be simi-
larly limited by adherence to a colorblindness ideal that obfuscates ac-
tionable racial stereotyping at work.258 The Supreme Court itself has iden-
tified these differences, by recognizing that disparate impact claims are 
actionable under Title VII—and, most recently, under the Fair Housing 
Act modeled on Title VII—despite its unavailability under Equal Protec-
tion.259 
Moreover, as a matter of doctrine and precedent, this is incorrect: a 
coherent and robust modern approach to Title VII should recognize the 
doctrinal differences between Title VII and Equal Protection and apply 
stereotype theory consistently, regardless of protected class. Legal schol-
ars—combined with recent sex stereotyping case law—have paved the 
path for doing so. In the context of caregiver discrimination, Joan C. Wil-
liams has identified that most workplaces are gendered, designed around 
a masculine norm of the “ideal worker” who is unencumbered and always 
available for work.260 Because of this, as Williams and I have addressed in 
previous work, “gender stereotypes arise in everyday workplace interac-
tions”: 
In a workplace that assumes an ideal worker without childbearing 
or childrearing responsibilities, a worker who gives birth and re-
turns to work as a mother will be treated as defective . . . . In a 
workplace shaped by masculine norms, women can and do success-
fully litigate sex discrimination by using the stereotypes that arise in 
everyday interactions as evidence of gender bias.261 
Sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway’s research identifying how people use sex 
and gender as a “primary frame for organizing” how they relate to others 
supports this approach.262 The gender frame “spreads gendered mean-
ings” throughout society, including the workplace, which embodies “ste-
reotypic assumptions.”263 And, Ridgeway explains, “[w]hen structures and 
procedures embody stereotypic gender assumptions, they themselves be-
come independent agents of bias in the workplace.”264 
In a parallel fashion, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s work sug-
gests, in effect, that most workplaces are raced.265 While often espousing a 
 
258 See generally Rich, supra note 26 (describing how Equal Protection and Title 
VII doctrine have points of both convergence and divergence—for example, unlike 
Equal Protection, “Title VII’s prohibitions against race discrimination in employment 
have no animus requirement,” id. at 231.). 
259 See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2516–26 (2015); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–48 (1976). 
260 See Williams, supra note 214, at 65–70.  
261 See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1338–39. 
262 See Ridgeway, supra note 19, at 7. 
263 Id. at 94–95. 
264 Id. at 96. 
265 See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 138 (describing the phenomenon of 
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commitment to diversity and “colorblindness,” most predominantly white 
workplaces start from certain institutional norms, in which many racial 
and ethnic minorities find themselves as “Outsiders” who must adopt a 
“Working Identity” to succeed at work: 
[R]acial stereotypes often conflict with institutional crite-
ria . . . [T]he existence of negative racial stereotypes (particularly as 
they conflict with institutional norms) creates an incentive for em-
ployees to work their identity to negate those stereotypes . . . 266 
Racial minorities, like caregivers, may encounter stereotyping from their 
very lack of “fit” with the institutional norms around which the workplace 
is designed; moreover, they may be held to different standards of per-
formance and forced to re-prove their competence.267 They should, like-
wise, be able to litigate race discrimination using everyday stereotyping as 
evidence of racial bias. 
Of course, as described previously, not all stereotyping is discrimina-
tory or illegal, and stereotype theory may not reach all aspects of gender 
or race performance, identity, or difference.268 But when employees are 
penalized at work based on stereotypes that affect perceptions of their 
competence or suitability for work, they should be similarly actionable, 
regardless of protected class. 
Some courts have successfully recognized the application of a Price 
Waterhouse-style stereotyping theory to race discrimination. The First Cir-
cuit’s decision in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak provides an example.269 After 
years of employment with excellent performance, the plaintiff—the only 
African-American woman in a department of six—was assigned a new su-
pervisor who undercut and criticized the plaintiff at every turn, denied 
and blocked her opportunities for advancement, and assessed her with 
“inaccurately low scores on her annual performance appraisals” that ul-
timately led to her termination.270 The court recognized that the plaintiff 
was “alleg[ing] a more subtle type of disparate treatment,” focused on 
“[t]he role of . . . stereotyping . . . discussed most thoroughly in that 
branch of disparate treatment law developed apart from the McDonnell 
Douglas . . . framework . . . known as the Price Waterhouse framework.”271 
Based on both stereotyping and comparator evidence, the court reversed 
summary judgment against the plaintiff, stating clearly that “[s]tereotypes 
or cognitive biases based on race are as incompatible with Title VII’s 
 
“Working Identity”). 
266 Id. at 26; see also id. at 1–35, 134–48. 
267 See supra notes 243–46. 
268 See supra notes 40, 102, 115–117 and accompanying text. 
269 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999).  
270 Id. at 45–46.  
271 Id. at 58–60. 
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mandate as stereotypes based on age or sex, [thus] here too, ‘the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment’  is prohibited.”272 
Likewise, in Kimble v. Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Development, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held in favor of an Af-
rican-American male plaintiff who alleged intersectional sex and race 
discrimination in pay on the basis of both comparator and stereotyping 
evidence.273 The court cited both Thomas and Price Waterhouse and dis-
cussed the literature on stereotyping and implicit bias, before finding 
that his supervisor “seemed to regard plaintiff as if he were ‘veiled with 
images of incompetency,’” which supported the plaintiff’s inference of 
discrimination.274 Despite this clear precedent, successful application of 
the stereotyping approach beyond the protected class of sex remains lim-
ited.275 
B. Revisiting Comparators and Stray Remarks 
To move the modern stereotyping frame beyond sex discrimination 
cases more concretely, courts can and should apply the specific doctrinal 
advancements on comparators and stray remarks to all employment dis-
crimination cases. First, based on the development of the law on compar-
ators in caregiver and transgender discrimination cases, all plaintiffs al-
leging intentional discrimination regardless of protected class should 
have the opportunity to create an inference of discrimination and survive 
the pleading stage without “comparator” evidence. Circuits that still cling 
to the comparator concept, insisting that the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work requires a comparator at either the prima facie or pretext stage, 
should be bound by precedent on comparators, most recently in the Su-
preme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS. In Young, the Court said, 
once again and definitively, that comparators are not required to create 
an inference of discrimination under Title VII.276 Moreover, even in the 
context of the one limited piece of the statute that requires compari-
sons—that pregnant women be treated “the same . . . as” employees with 
similar physical ability or inability to work—the Court said that the stat-
ute does not require that employees be otherwise similarly situated, “simi-
lar in all but the protected ways.”277 Where a plaintiff alleging disparate 
treatment lacks comparator evidence but produces relevant evidence of 
stereotyping relating to the protected class, caregiver and transgender 
 
272 Id. at 42, 59, 60.  
273 690 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
274 Id. at 768–69, 770–71,775–78 (citation omitted). 
275 See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text. 
276 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
277 Id. 
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discrimination precedent hold that this may create an inference of dis-
crimination.278  
Thus a plaintiff who believes that stereotypes about his race or na-
tional origin played a role in an adverse employment action he experi-
enced, particularly if those stereotypes relate to his work capabilities or 
commitment, suitability for promotion, or ability to fit in with the work 
culture, may use a stereotype theory and stereotyping evidence to create 
an inference of discrimination, just as caregiver and transgender plain-
tiffs have done with evidence of sex stereotyping. Counterfactual applica-
tion of this theory to examples of cases in which race discrimination 
plaintiffs have lost on summary judgment due to lack of comparator evi-
dence illustrate the incoherence of such holdings. 
In one case, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment against the 
plaintiff, a black doctor of African national origin, who alleged that he 
was discriminated against because of his race and national origin when 
the hospital at which he worked terminated his fellowship.279 After de-
scribing his requirement to prove, as the fourth prong of his prima facie 
case, that he “was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was 
treated differently than similarly-situated, nonprotected employees,” the 
court held that, because no such comparator existed, he could not pro-
ceed with his race discrimination claim.280 The only other similarly situat-
ed employee was African-American; because the other doctor was “of the 
same racial group,” the court held, he could not serve as a “non-
protected employee” to satisfy the plaintiff’s required proof.281 In another 
case, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment against a plaintiff who 
alleged race discrimination when he was singled out, given poor perfor-
mance reviews, and suspended for errors he alleged were attributed to 
him but were actually the fault of his coworker and supervisor.282 Again, 
the court took the narrowest view of the comparator requirement, find-
ing that the plaintiff’s white coworker who did the exact same job could 
not serve as a comparator because the coworker was only in that position 
on a temporary basis.283 In neither of these two cases did the court make 
any mention of creating an inference of discrimination: both plaintiffs 
 
278 See id.; supra Part II.A.2. (caregiver discrimination); Part II.A.3. (transgender 
discrimination). 
279 Adebisi v. Univ. of Tenn., 341 F. App’x 111, 112 (6th Cir. 2009). 
280 See id. 
281 See id. Note the court held that this comparator was suitable to meet the 
fourth prong of the prima facie case for plaintiff’s national origin discrimination 
claim but upheld summary judgment on that claim, too, based on plaintiff’s failure to 
prove pretext. Id. at 113. 
282 Zanders v. Potter, 223 F. App’x 470, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2007). 
283 Id. 
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lacked similarly situated comparators, so both plaintiffs lost on summary 
judgment.284 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that neither plaintiff had evidence on 
which to legitimately support including a stereotype theory or frame as 
part of his claims; neither case decision makes any mention of stereotyp-
ing. On the other hand, both cases involved subjective assessments of the 
plaintiffs’ performance, and both plaintiffs believed they were singled out 
and subject to unfair scrutiny due to their race.285 If the plaintiffs offered 
any evidence that racially stereotyped perceptions of their work abilities 
played a role in their adverse actions, they should have been able to cre-
ate an inference of discrimination with the stereotyping evidence, even in 
the absence of comparators. What is more, because both plaintiffs were 
in the Sixth Circuit and both decisions were made after that court’s 2004 
decision in Smith v. City of Salem, the court was bound by Smith and subse-
quent Sixth Circuit precedent in which plaintiffs alleging transgender 
discrimination were able to create an inference of discrimination based 
on a stereotype theory with little or no comparative evidence.286 
Current social science research shows us how individuals can be 
harmed by stereotyping even if other members of their protected class 
are not.287 This insight, coupled with the persistence of race and gender 
segregation in our workforce,288 makes moving beyond the comparator 
requirement is essential to modernizing Title VII doctrine to reach dis-
crimination in its current forms. In her work extensively documenting 
the rise and continued grip of the comparator requirement, Suzanne 
Goldberg describes how cases alleging harassment or stereotyping pro-
vide a useful “contextual” approach, whereby courts “look[] to all of the 
surrounding circumstances for the ways in which the protected traits may 
have operated to affect employer decisionmaking,” and argues similarly 
that this contextual approach should be a “legitimate analytic option in 
all cases.”289 Significant court of appeals and even Supreme Court prece-
dent in contemporary sex stereotyping cases now provide the model for 
doing so. 
Likewise, where plaintiffs provide evidence of stereotypical beliefs in 
the workplace, courts can and should follow advances in the law in care-
giver and transgender discrimination cases to view such evidence as rele-
vant stereotyping evidence, rather than discounting it as “stray remarks.” 
All plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination regardless of protected 
class should be able to benefit from courts’ understanding, in the care-
 
284 Adebisi, 341 F. App’x at 112–13; Zanders, 223 F. App’x at 470–71. 
285 Adebisi, 341 F. App’x at 113; Zanders, 223 F. App’x at 470. 
286 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); supra Part II.A. 
287 See supra note 138. 
288 See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
289 See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 779–80, 808. 
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giver context, of how stereotypes that relate to a plaintiff’s suitability or 
“fit” at work may relate to an adverse employment decision, even if not 
temporally proximate or expressed by the ultimate decision maker. 
Moreover, the treatment of gender stereotyping as direct evidence of dis-
crimination in some transgender discrimination cases offers the possibil-
ity of returning direct evidence to its rightful status: should a plaintiff 
have evidence that an adverse action was taken because of a stereotype 
associated with a protected class, courts should recognize that as twenty-
first-century direct evidence. 
Again, applying this insight counterfactually to cases in which plain-
tiffs had useful stereotyping evidence discounted as stray remarks illus-
trates its value to coherence in the doctrine of Title VII. For example, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judg-
ment against an African-American plaintiff who was terminated from his 
position as a regional sales representative at a medical packaging compa-
ny.290 The plaintiff employee alleged disparate treatment on the basis of 
comparative evidence, claiming that the defendant employer miscon-
strued the plaintiff’s performance and did not terminate “similarly situat-
ed white employees.”291 In its analysis of pretext, the court noted that, 
“although [the p]laintiff made no arguments about this issue in his 
briefs,” there was “evidence in the record” that the plaintiff’s supervisor 
“made a comment . . . of a racial nature.”292 As the evidence showed, the 
supervisor had made remarks to the plaintiff, shortly after he was hired, 
“to the effect that black men know how to post-up in the low post [in 
basketball], but do not know the medical packaging business.”293 Yet just 
as quickly as it identified this stereotypical statement, the court found it 
to be “simply a stray remark, which no reasonable jury could find” sup-
ported proof of pretext in the case.294 
To be sure, there was significant evidence in the case documenting 
plaintiff’s performance problems, which was the defendant’s proffered 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.295 Still, the 
plaintiff’s comparative theory of disparate treatment turned on a double 
standard in how performance (competence) was measured: he believed 
he should have been judged on improvement over the prior year’s sales 
as opposed to total sales in the abstract, and he alleged that white em-
ployees with similar relative performance were not terminated.296 And yet 
 
290 Taylor v. Amcor Flexibles Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 501, 511 (D.N.J. 2009), as cited 
in Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 164. 
291 Taylor, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 505. 
292 Id. at 511. 
293 Id. The phrase “post-up in the low post” is a reference to a basketball 
maneuver. 
294 Id.  
295 Id. at 507–11. 
296 Id. at 506–07. 
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he neither alleged stereotyping nor even highlighted the supervisor’s 
statement, which the court found concerning enough to highlight itself 
before granting summary judgment.297 Had the plaintiff included a stere-
otype theory, alleging not only that his race but that racial stereotypes—
here clearly related to his knowledge of and suitability for work in his 
field because he was black—led to his disparate treatment, precedent 
from the sex stereotyping cases should have governed. Viewed under the 
broader lens of stereotyping evidence, this statement—made by the very 
decision maker who assessed his performance and terminated him—was 
anything but stray. 
In her detailed analysis of the stray remarks doctrine, Kerri Stone 
explains how the concept of stray remarks is out of step with modern un-
derstandings of the reality of social cognition.298 The fact that courts not 
only disqualify stray remarks from serving as direct evidence but also 
generally discount the inferential value of such remarks, Stone argues, 
“fails to comport with an informed understanding of how human beings 
cultivate, harbor, and express bias against others.”299 The insistence on 
temporal proximity of any comment evincing bias is particularly illogical, 
Stone notes, because of the very fact that much of this discrimination is 
subconscious or implicit: “the utterance of a comment in another context 
lends credence to the theory that the decision maker’s bias carried over 
from her life outside of work into her professional life.”300 Numerous 
courts have been able to recognize the importance of taking a broader 
view of stereotyping evidence in the context of sex discrimination cases; 
they can and should apply this approach to all discrimination cases re-
gardless of protected class. 
C. Removing Roadblocks with Stereotype Theory 
Beyond its ability to overcome the comparator requirement and the 
stray remarks doctrine, applying a stereotype frame to cases pled under 
the two other theories for litigating second generation discrimination—
disparate treatment involving implicit bias and disparate impact—may 
serve as an important response to recent constraints placed on those the-
ories’ by the Roberts Court. 
1. Stereotyping as the “Glue” for Implicit Bias Class Cases 
As described previously, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court re-
jected plaintiffs’ social framework proof that the company’s policy of rely-
ing on unchecked subjective decision making fostered implicit bias re-
 
297 Id. 
298 Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 182–89; see also Albiston et al., supra 
note 213, at 1293.  
299 Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 183. 
300 Id. at 184, 188. 
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sulting in sex discrimination.301 The Court majority found plaintiffs 
lacked evidentiary “glue” to link the decisions together—as scholars later 
described it, a lack of some “connective tissue” or a “coherent narrative” 
of discrimination.302 
Indeed, it was stereotyping evidence that plaintiffs used as this glue 
when they later pursued the same claims but across a smaller region of 
the company. On remand after the Supreme Court’s 2011 Wal-Mart deci-
sion, when the same plaintiffs narrowed their case to focus on a smaller 
region of mostly California stores, they included sex stereotyping evi-
dence evincing “a culture and philosophy of gender bias shared by the 
relevant decision makers.”303 As described by the California federal dis-
trict court hearing the new version of the case, the plaintiffs provided ev-
idence that, at a required training, California store managers were told 
the lack of women in Wal-Mart senior management was “attributable to 
men being ‘more aggressive in achieving those levels of responsibility,’” 
and were “cautioned that efforts to promote women could lead to the se-
lection of less qualified candidates.”304 The plaintiffs also offered evi-
dence of statements by the company CEO “that could be interpreted as 
communicating that men had traits that were more likely to make them 
successful.” 305 Despite the fact that “the basic theory of Plaintiffs’ claims 
has changed little,” the addition of stereotyping evidence was responsive 
enough to the Supreme Court’s holding—which “rested not on a total 
rejection of plaintiffs’ theories, but on the inadequacy of their proof”—
for the district court to deny a motion to dismiss the case.306 
Likewise, other recent cases alleging a pattern or practice of sex dis-
crimination, including those filed against pharmaceutical companies No-
vartis and Daiichi Sankyo and financial giant Goldman Sachs, have sur-
vived challenges by alleging an implicit bias theory with a stereotyping 
frame. Plaintiffs in these cases used stereotyping evidence to bolster their 
statistical evidence, arguing both that workplace structures allowed im-
plicit bias to infect many individual employment decisions and that those 
 
301 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–57 (2011). See Part I.B.2. 
302 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2552; Selmi, Theorizing, supra note 88, at 481; Zatz, 
supra note 88, at 388, 390–91. 
303 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 8, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 21, 2012), (No. C 01-02252 CRB). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. After surviving the motion to dismiss, however, the plaintiffs again lost on 
their motion for class certification, as the court held that the class was still too big to 
meet commonality required for class treatment. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 964 F. 
Supp. 2d 1115, 1125, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2013). For most cases, the ability to survive a 
motion to dismiss would still be a significant victory; after twelve years of litigation 
with no settlement, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs were in a unique position. 
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decisions were made within a work culture of gender stereotyping.307 The 
Novartis plaintiffs alleged stereotyping evidence including: one manag-
er’s expressed preference not to hire young women because “[f]irst 
comes love, then comes marriage, then comes flex time and a baby car-
riage”; another’s alleged encouragement of a pregnant employee to get 
an abortion; and a third’s urging employees during a training “to avoid 
getting pregnant.”308 The Daiichi Sankyo plaintiffs described “a sales 
strategy built upon gender stereotypes,” alleging that “pregnant women 
and working mothers with young children [did] not fit within the stereo-
typical role promoted by [that] strategy,” and that female employees were 
“actively discouraged from having children”—warned that they’d be 
“committing ‘career suicide’” if they became pregnant or sought preg-
nancy leave or reduced schedules.309 And the Goldman Sachs plaintiffs 
successfully distinguished their claims from the Wal-Mart case by both 
their smaller class size and by identifying several work policies known to 
foster sex stereotyping, including “360-degree review” performance eval-
uation and “tap on the shoulder” promotion selection systems.310 Telling-
ly, each of these successful cases included class-wide claims of caregiver 
discrimination and evidence of a culture of impermissible stereotypes 
that linked protected class status (sex, motherhood) to a lack of suitabil-
ity for work. 
2. Stereotyping to “Smoke Out” Intent in Disparate Impact Cases 
Less obvious, but still important to recognize, is the potential for the 
role of stereotypes in disparate impact claims—particularly given the 
Roberts Court majority’s view that disparate impact theory should be ap-
plied narrowly and is most properly used as a way to “smoke out” dis-
guised intentional discrimination.311 Stereotyping evidence, traditionally 
associated with disparate treatment, serves a different role in disparate 
impact cases, which, as described previously, do not follow McDonnell 
 
307  See Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 13-cv-00581-WHO, 2014 WL 2126877, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2014); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-
06950-LBS-JCF, 2012 WL 2912741, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012); Velez v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 260–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Daiichi Sankyo Gender 
Pay, Promotion and Pregnancy Discrimination Class Action, Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP, 
http://www.sanfordheisler.com/cases/daiichi-sankyo-gender-discrimination-class-
action; Goldman Sachs Gender Discrimination Class Action, Goldman Gender Case, 
http://goldmangendercase.com/; Novartis Pharmaceutical Gender Discrimination Class 
Action, Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP, http://www.sanfordheisler.com/cases/novartis-
pharmaceutical-gender-discrimination-class-action. But see E.E.O.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 778 
F.Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that stereotyping evidence was insufficient to 
support plaintiffs’ pattern or practice sex discrimination case). 
308 Velez, 244 F.R.D. at 267–68. 
309 See Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., Complaint, No. C 13 0581, 2013 WL 
497246 (N.D.Cal., February 11, 2013). 
310 See Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 2912741, at *2–4. 
311 See supra Part I.B.1; supra note 72. 
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Douglas burden-shifting but instead require plaintiff to show that an em-
ployer’s facially neutral policy creates an adverse impact on members of a 
protected class, and that the practice is neither justified by a business ne-
cessity nor can be replaced by an alternative, less discriminatory prac-
tice.312 Yet stereotypes may play a part in various stages of this frame-
work—for example, if how the defendant employer justifies the policy as 
something that is a business necessity reflects not a real “necessity” but 
rather the product of stereotyped thinking, or if the employer’s view that 
a less discriminatory alternative practice will not suffice relies on stereo-
typical beliefs rather than reality. 
The Third Circuit case Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor-
tation Authority (SEPTA) suggests an example.313 In Lanning, female ap-
plicants for transit authority police positions alleged sex discrimination 
under a disparate impact theory, challenging the requirement that, to be 
hired, applicants must run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes.314 Plaintiffs demon-
strated that only 12% of female applicants as compared to 60% of male 
applicants could pass this screening test, but that officers hired prior to 
the institution of the requirement were not held to the same standard.315 
The court’s analysis focused on whether SEPTA could meet the “business 
necessity” defense allowed to employers under the disparate impact theo-
ry.316 As the court defined it, to be a “business necessity,” a test cut-off 
score with disparate results must “measur[e] the minimum qualifications 
necessary for successful performance of the job,” which the court held 
SEPTA had not proven.317 “A business necessity standard that wholly de-
fers to an employer’s judgment as to what is desirable in an employee,” 
the court noted, “is completely inadequate in combating covert discrimi-
nation based upon societal prejudices.”318  
 
312 See id. 
313 181 F.3d 478 (3rd Cir 1999). 
314 Lanning, 181 F.3d at 482. 
315 Id. at 483–86. 
316 Id. at 490–94. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. at 490. In a subsequent decision, the Third Circuit affirmed judgment in 
favor of SEPTA, holding that, after “allow[ing] the parties to expand the record in 
keeping with our newly-announced standard…SEPTA produced…competent 
evidence to support the finding” that its test did, in fact, “measur[e] the minimum 
qualifications necessary…thus…showing business necessity.” Lanning v SEPTA, 308 
F.3d 286, 288–93 (3d Cir. 2002). However, relying on Lanning, other plaintiffs have 
survived summary judgment where they showed that a physical ability test based on 
assumptions had a disparate impact by sex. See, e.g., Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 
F.Supp.2d 323, 343 (2011) (noting that defense expert “stated that ‘it’s reasonable to 
assume [that] higher levels of fitness correlate with more positive outcomes and fewer 
negative outcomes,’ but did not provide any evidence” to support assumption); 
United States v. City of Erie, 411 F.Supp.2d 524, 555, 558–59 (2005) (noting that 
defense expert “assume[d] one of the facts that Title VII requires the City to prove”). 
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Other plaintiffs have succeeded in challenging employers’ assump-
tions of what constitutes a “necessary” employment practice by exposing 
stereotyped thinking. When a postal worker alleged that a policy prohib-
iting use of sick leave to care for sick family members had a disparate im-
pact by sex, she included evidence that, prior to the imposition of this 
policy by a new postmaster, she had successfully used sick leave to care 
for her sick child without incident.319 A Texas federal district court de-
nied the employer’s motion for summary judgment and ordered addi-
tional briefing in her case.320 When female workers at a specialty glass 
plant alleged that the ranking system used to determine who would be 
laid off had a disparate impact on women, they included evidence that 
the discretionary system was used within a work context marked by gen-
der stereotyping, including supervisors who “were . . . often dismissive of 
women in the workplace, derisively referring to certain tasks as ‘women’s 
work.’”321 A Pennsylvania federal district court agreed, denying summary 
judgment for the employer and holding that the evaluation system failed 
the business necessity defense against a disparate impact claim.322 The 
ranking system, the court explained, “built in a bias towards the skills 
men had obtained in a workplace that was largely sex-segregated,” so that 
“a jury could…find that the [system] was designed to perpetuate the 
long-term biases in the factory and did not adequately measure who 
could actually perform the new jobs.”323 
As these cases demonstrate, where a policy or practice that has a dis-
criminatory impact is based on assumptions about what makes someone 
suitable for work, stereotyping evidence may be useful in overcoming an 
employer’s “business necessity” defense and unmasking biases built into 
workplace structures. 
CONCLUSION 
Looking to the success of cases on the margins of antidiscrimination 
law provides a unique perspective from which to see doctrinal and theo-
retical innovations. At a time when the Roberts Court has acted to limit 
disparate impact and implicit bias-based disparate treatment theories, 
federal courts faced with caregiver and transgender discrimination cases 
have been able to recognize the unlawful impact of protected class stere-
otypes in the workplace. Relying on stereotypes to make decisions is not 
 
319 See Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
320 Id. at 284, 287–89; see also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l, 660 F.2d 811, 819–20 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying summary judgment where rule prohibiting leave over ten 
days had a disparate impact by sex/pregnancy). 
321 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Schott N. Am., Inc., 2008 WL 4452715, 
*4–8 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 29, 2008). 
322 Id. at *12–14. 
323 Id. at *14. 
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in and of itself always harmful, and many stereotypes are based on demo-
graphically accurate information. But when protected class stereotypes 
involve assumptions about an individual’s work competence, commit-
ment, or fit, Title VII prohibits them—regardless of how an employer 
treats anyone else in the workplace. Caregiver and transgender discrimi-
nation cases have demonstrated this line, and have provided new path-
ways of proof that may benefit all plaintiffs alleging second generation 
discrimination. 
Of course, relying on stereotype theory and stereotyping evidence as 
a means to unify and revive antidiscrimination litigation is not without its 
own limitations. Critics would argue that stereotyping is not a panacea to 
constraints in antidiscrimination law for a number of reasons. First, not 
every plaintiff can produce stereotyping evidence. The reason why such 
strong “loose lips”324 evidence exists in caregiver and transgender cases is 
that mothers and transgender employees are at the margins of what is 
protected by Title VII (which also explains why such cases have been 
marginalized). People are more likely to express stereotypical beliefs 
about gender than about race—particularly ideas about motherhood, 
femininity, and masculinity—because those beliefs are, on some level, 
more culturally embedded and socially acceptable.325 Second, even when 
a plaintiff might have evidence of stereotypes associated with race or na-
tional origin, it is more likely that such stereotyping evidence will be dis-
counted as bias “in the air” and not related to the adverse employment 
decision or evidence from which to infer discrimination.326 Third, as sug-
gested by Suzanne Goldberg in discussing alternatives to the comparator 
requirement, allowing plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the ba-
sis of stereotyping evidence could open the floodgates to more cases get-
ting further along in the litigation process, causing employers and the 
courts to incur associated costs.327 
A stereotyping approach will not miraculously solve these problems. 
Still, social science tells us that stereotypes of all kinds are still very 
strongly held and that people commonly rely upon stereotypes when 
making subjective assessments and decisions.328 Applying a stereotyping 
 
324 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 77, 92, 107 
(2003) (naming and describing “loose lips” evidence). 
325 See Selmi, Evolution, supra note 105, at 979 (“One important difference with 
gender stereotypes is that they are less likely to be implicit in nature if by implicit we 
mean that the person who holds the stereotype is unaware of doing so. A person may 
be unwilling to admit fidelity to the gender stereotype, but that is not the same as 
being unaware of its force.”). 
326 See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 787 & n.197 (citing Carbado & Gulati, supra 
note 138). 
327 Id. at 811. 
328 See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1186–90, 1241–44. 
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lens to an employment discrimination case does not necessarily require 
unearthing the rare overt statement of stereotyping that may not exist in 
a race or national origin case; by applying the same theory of why and 
when caregiver and transgender stereotyping at work is unlawful, the ap-
proach becomes clear. When a protected class stereotype infects percep-
tions of an employee’s work—for example, assessment of the employee’s 
competence, suitability for leadership, or “cultural fit”—and the result is 
an adverse employment action, courts should recognize that as illegal 
discrimination. That is the harm that lies under the surface of much cov-
ert second generation discrimination. Courts have been able to recognize 
these connections and the social science of stereotyping in sex stereotyp-
ing cases; they can and should do so for all such cases, regardless of pro-
tected class. 
To the extent that an “everybody stereotypes” approach risks open-
ing the floodgates to questionable discrimination claims, such concerns 
are unfounded. While everybody may stereotype, Price Waterhouse tells us 
that stereotyping is only unlawful and actionable under Title VII when it 
plays a role in an adverse employment decision.329 Any plaintiff alleging a 
stereotype theory still has to use stereotyping or comparative evidence to 
create an inference of discrimination to survive through the pleading 
stage. The comparator requirement and stray remarks doctrine are so in-
grained in the consciousness of federal court judges that if a plaintiff has 
convinced a court to infer discrimination with stereotyping evidence 
alone, that plaintiff has a legitimate claim that should not be dismissed. 
And, should the number of cases and associated costs to courts and 
employers rise by any noticeable measure, that is not necessarily a bad 
thing.330 The Title VII litigation frameworks were not created by the Su-
preme Court so that most employment discrimination plaintiffs would 
lose on summary judgment; they were created to root out cases in which 
it was unlikely that impermissible consideration of a protected class moti-
vated the employer’s actions. Were more cases to survive the pleading 
stage based on stereotyping evidence, employers would have an im-
portant incentive to take stereotyping seriously and make greater efforts 
to reduce reliance on stereotypes in workplace decision making. The ul-
timate result would be to reinvigorate Title VII and its ability to reach 
workplace attitudes and practices that continue to stand as significant 
barriers to equality in employment. 
Recent plaintiff successes in pioneering sex stereotyping cases sug-
gest the potential for evolution in antidiscrimination law. Transgender 
 
329 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–55 (1989); supra Part I.B.3. 
330 See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 811 (“I would argue . . . these costs are more 
than matched by the benefit of having open jurisprudential discussion and debate 
about the proper reach of discrimination doctrine. . . . A move to a contextual 
evaluation would open the possibility of conversation and perhaps lead to refinement 
of the jurisprudence.”). 
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and caregiver discrimination cases demonstrate that stereotypes operate 
in similar ways to disadvantage employees based on a perceived lack of 
competence or suitability for work. Caregiver discrimination cases have 
also helped unearth that many workplace structures are inherently gen-
dered—that is, that many work norms, policies, and practices embody 
and foster reliance on gender stereotypes.331 Combining these two in-
sights offers a modern way to recognize entrenched bias in the work-
place. Regardless of the protected class in question, all courts can and 
should apply the lessons provided by recent leading-edge sex stereotyp-
ing cases—cases that demonstrate how, even fifty years after Title VII’s 
enactment, litigation under the statute continues to spark progress to-
ward ever greater workplace equality. 
 
 
331 See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1338–39. 
